Beyond Tort Reform: Developin Better Tools for Assessing Damages for Personar Injury by Blumstein, James F. et al.
Beyond Tort Reform: Developin Better Tools for




This Article proposes two reforms designed to improve on existing mecha-
nisms for assessing personal injury damages without deviating from the essen-
tial goals of the current tort law system. The first proposal asserts the need
for a "common law" of damages. It suggests development of a reporting system
to record damage awards that would have precedential value for future
awards. The second proposal is a plan to pay for future services not with
traditional cash payments but rather by funding actual service contracts for
necessary care. These reforms should achieve more accurate awards in individ-
ual cases of personal injury and should promote consistency across cases.
I. Identifying the Problems: The Need for Improvement ......... 173
II. A "Common Law" Of Damages And Presumptive Scheduling . . 177
A. Using Prior Awards as Precedent: A Proposal ........ 178
1. A Comprehensive Reporting System .............. 180
2. Using Data on Prior Findings ................ 181
B. Implementation ........................... 185
C. Constitutionality ............................. 186
III. Insurance Contracts For Future Services ................. 188
A. The Basic Reform Proposal ..................... 190
B. Rationale .............................. 194
tProfessor of Law and Senior Fellow, Institute for Public Policy Studies (VIPPS), Vanderbilt
'University.
ttSenior Research Associate at The Urban Institute, Washington, DC.
tttCentennial Professor of Economics and Director, Health Policy Center, Institute for Public Policy
Studies (VIPPS), Vanderbilt University.
This paper and its underlying research were funded by The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (grant
no. 12,412). This support is gratefully acknowledged. Partial support of Professor Blumstein's time on
this paper came from an HCA Foundation grant. We also thank David Baldus, Joseph Newhouse, Jeffrey
O'Connell, Wayne Vroman, and Walter Wadlington for their contributions to our thinking. The authors
are solely responsible for the contents of this article. Portions of the introductory material are drawn from
the authors' earlier work. See Bovbjerg, Sloan & Blumstein, infra note 2.
Copyright © 1991 by the Yale Journal on Regulation
Yale Journal on' Regulation
C. Analysis of Specific Provisions .......
1. Coverage .................
2. Scope of Contracts and Bids .....
3. "Final-Offer" Dispute Resolution . .
4. Choice of Arbitrator ..........
5. Cashouts and Buy-outs .........
6. Characteristics of the Insurer .....
7. Regulation
D. Practical Feasibility ..............
1. Insurance-Oriented Concerns .......
2. Some Promising Precedents .......
3. Other Implementation Issues.......
E. Constitutionality ................















Today's system for assessing tort damages lacks standards for uniform
assessment, gives its inexperienced juries too little information and too much
discretion, and hence yields extremely variable results. Valuations of personal
injury vary enormously for the same basic severity of injury. Such
inconsistency results in systemic unfairness and operational inefficiencies.
System-perfecting reform is in order if for no other reason than to defuse
some of the more radical proposals that would more seriously threaten the
traditional and fundamental premises of the tort system.' This article proposes
two approaches to reform designed to improve on existing mechanisms for
assessing damages for personal injuries within the framework of the current
tort law system.
Section I elaborates on the need for improvement in the existing system.
Section II proposes the development of a "common law" of damages. It would
be implemented by creating a reporting system to record damage awards that
would have precedential value for future damage awards. Certain mainstream
1. The current round of tort reform fails to address the fundamental accuracy or consistency of the
process. See Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis of the 1970's: A Retrospective, 49 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (Spring 1986); Bovbjerg, Legislation on Medical Malpractice: Further Developments
and a Preliminary Report Card, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 499 (1989).
Some reforms have proposed radically simplified-and curtailed-rules of damages, administered
outside of courts. Organized medicine has proposed such non-judicial scheduling. See, e.g., AM. MED.
ASS'N., A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE TO THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR RESOLVING MEDICAL LIABILITY
DISPUTES: A FAULT-BASED, ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 144-55 (1988); PHYs. INSUR. ASS'N. OF AM., A
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF RESOLVING MEDICAL LIABILITY
CLAIMS 158-59, 161-62 (1989). However, non-judicial resolution seems far from acceptance given the lack




damage awards would be presumptively valid, whereas extreme awards-very
high or low when compared to similar cases-would receive special scrutiny.
The system would allow the law on appropriateness of damages to progress
in a common-law, monitored fashion rather than on today's wholly ad hoc and
discretionary basis. It would promote consistency and predictability of overall
valuations by narrowing the very broad and standardless discretion currently
accorded to juries. It also would improve accountability by establishing a
firmer basis for judicial oversight of jury decisionmaking.
Section III develops a proposal for structuring awards for future medical
care and other services in cases of severe permanent injury. The proposal is
to pay for future services neither through the traditional lump-sum cash
payments nor through an annuity-like set of periodic ("structured") cash
payments, but instead by funding an actual service contract for necessary care.
This would assure needed services for seriously injured claimants based on
marketplace determinations of cost backed by binding contracts. It would also
provide a vehicle for assisting juries in their determination of particular
elements of loss. 2
I. Identifying the Problems: The Need for Improvement
The desire for flexibility is a fundamental part of the traditional culture of
tort law. The ideal is to fine-tune damage awards to particular facts and
circumstances in order to achieve individualized justice for victims: to make
successful plaintiffs whole.3
Trial by a jury of one's peers is the customary instrument for implementing
this ideal. The jury needs sufficient flexibility and discretion to "do right" by
the injured victim, in accordance with broad standards but in the context of
ostensibly unique circumstances.
While the goal of making a successful plaintiff "whole" seems to be reas-
onably precise, the substantive law must accommodate the desire for
individualized justice by stating its standards with a high level of abstraction
and ambiguity. In practical terms, the substantive law of personal injury speaks
in generalities. It provides vague, qualitative guidelines for juries who have
2. Some reformists have suggested ways of "scheduling" intangible damages to make assessments
fairer and easier for juries to make. See generally Bovbjerg, Sloan & Blumstein, Valuing Life and Limb
in Ton: Scheduling Pain and Suffering, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908, 922 (1989) (proposing alternative
approaches to perfect the valuation of non-economic damages within the framework of the current liability
system); Levin, Pain and Suffering Guidelines: A Cure for Damages Measurement 'Anomie,' 22 J. L.
REFORM 303 (1989).
3. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1965) (a purpose of a tort action is "to give
compensation, indemnity or restitution for harms").
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the responsibility, in the first instance at least, of implementing the compensa-
tory ideal.'
Judicial statements appear to revel in the lack of objective standards for
determining damage awards; they articulate a culture of flexibility and indeter-
minateness. For example, more than a century ago, the United States Supreme
Court stated that "there cannot be any fixed measure of compensation... ,
but the result must be left to turn mainly upon the good sense and deliberate
judgment of the tribunal assigned by law to ascertain what is a just compensa-
tion for the injuries inflicted." 5 More recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court
noted that "jt]here is and there can be no fixed basis, table, standard, or
mathematical rule which will serve as an accurate index and guide to the
establishment of damage awards for personal injuries. " '
The price that has been paid for this commitment to the ideal of individual-
ized justice in administering the tort system is that today's system for assessing
tort damages lacks uniform standards. Case-by-case determinations by ad hoc
trial juries have produced extremely variable results in what appear to be very
similar cases. Valuations of personal injury vary enormously for injuries of
the same basic severity, and the variation remains considerable even controlling
for obvious differences in circumstances like age, income, and medical bills.7
As an illustration, empirical research has shown that jury valuations for
injuries like paraplegia vary enormously-$523,000 at the 25th percentile of
the sample distribution and $2.7 million at the 75th percentile.' Some of the
4. The standard judicial charge to a trial jury reflects this broad discretion, and the exercise of
particularized judgment by jurors:
In determining the amount of plaintiff's damages, if any, you may take into consideration the
following elements as shown by the evidence:
1. The [plaintiff's] pain and suffering, disabilities or disfigurement, and any accompanying mental
anguish.
2. The reasonable and necessary medical expenses incurred or paid.
3. The loss of time or earnings.
In arriving at the amount of your award, you will take into consideration the nature, extent, and
duration of the plaintiff's injuries, if any, his age, and his general health and condition both
before and after the occurrence of the injuries complained of.
See 8 AM. JUR. PL. & PR. FoRMs 274 (1982).
5. The "City of Panama", 101 U.S. 453, 464 (1879).
6. Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 92-93, 138 A.2d 713, 718 (1958).
7. Multiple regression analysis controlling for severity of injury and many other factors can explain
over 60% of the variation in verdicts and finds large discrepancies among categories of cases. See R.
Bovbjerg, F. Sloan, A. Dor & C. Hsieh, Juries and Justice: Are Malpractice and Other Personal Injuries
Created Equal? LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming) (two-fold differences in five jurisdictions);
Hammitt, Carroll, & Relies, Tort Standards and Jury Decisions, 14 J. LEO. STUD. 751, 753-56 (1985)
(up to 250% difference, one jurisdiction); A. CHIN & M. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS:
WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS 56-57 (1985) (one jurisdiction).
8. These data were drawn from jury valuations from Kansas City and Florida. They reflect 1973-87
valuations, adjusted for the extent of comparative negligence, and are stated in 1987 dollars. Dispersion
was even larger further in the tails of the distribution. See Bovbjerg, Sloan & Blumstein, supra note 2,
at 919-24.
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difference in awards may reflect characteristics of actual loss that analysts
cannot observe, but that is not likely to explain all of the variance.9
In addition to the lack of substantive standards in the current system (and
the concomitant essentially uncabined discretion of juries), it is likely that the
variability in awards is attributable to the procedural discretion given to juries,
to the inexperience of juries, and to the lack of information provided to juries.
Juries have traditionally operated through general verdicts in which they make
unitary findings of liability with an associated award of all damages. Juries
have not been expected to explain or justify their reasoning or to indicate what
methods they used for reaching a particular damage award. Jury deliberations
are viewed as a proverbial "black box." As a consequence, jury findings are
difficult to review.' 0 Judicial oversight provides only a limited check on jury
discretion. "
Trial judges traditionally have had the authority to modify a jury verdict.
They can decrease it through remittitur or raise it by additur; they can enter
judgment notwithstanding the jury's verdict; or they can order a new trial.' 2
The law disfavors such judicial intervention, however, and calls for change
only in cases of egregious error. 3 At the appellate level, courts are obliged
to defer to damage findings in the trial court. Generally, the standard of review
on appeal is abuse of discretion, 4 with the evidence being evaluated in a light
most favorable to upholding the judgment of the trial court. 5 As a practical
matter,, therefore, most post-verdict changes in jury awards occur through
settlement, not by judicial oversight of jury findings.16
Damage awards in tort cases are thus established in a climate of detailed
attention to very particularized circumstances, within a culture of decision-
9. See Bovbjerg, Sloan, Dor & Hsieh, supra note 7.
10. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 256 n. 12 (1981) ("Ordinarily, an error
in the charge is difficult, if not impossible, to correct without retrial, in light of the jury's general
verdict.").
11. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 16 (1935) (noting that courts
protect jury verdicts from attack by making it hard for jurors to impeach their own verdicts later and
limiting appellate review of a trial court's refusal to grant a new trial); see also District of Columbia v.
Woodbury, 136 U.S. 450, 459 (1890) (amount of damages is a jury question, to be determined in view
of the circumstances of each particular case).
12. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 11, at § 19.
13. See id. at §§ 16-19. One classic formulation would allow remittitur only where damages are
"flagrantly outrageous" or "extravagant," showing the jury to have acted from "passion, partiality,
prejudice, or corruption." 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 1022 (1988).
14. See, e.g., Bingaman v. Grays Harbor Community Hosp., 103 Wash. 2d 831, 699 P.2d 1230
(1985).
15. See, e.g., Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498, 507, 364 P.2d 337, 342, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 161, 166 (1961).
16. According to a major systematic study, post-trial adjustments are made to 25% of plaintiff verdicts.
Almost all such adjustments are reductions. See M. SHANLEY & M. PETERSON, POSTTRIAL ADJUSTMENTS
TO JURY AWARDS 26-27 (Rand Corp. No. R-351 1-ICJ, 1987) (based on random sample of verdicts from
Chicago, San Francisco, and selected California counties). Of the reductions, 62% result from private
settlement, 23% from court action, and 13% from collection problems. Most of the court actions occurred
on motion to the trial court rather than through the appeals process. Id. at 45-46.
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making discretion and flexibility, and under a regime of deferential substantive
and procedural standards. Additionally, ad hoc, inexperienced juries exercise
an enormous scope of discretion. No reservoir of experience accumulates to
provide a context or frame of reference to guide juries or judges. There is, at
present, simply no analogue in the damage award process to the guidance
common law provides in the process of legal interpretation. The role of prece-
dent is of great significance in the development of legal principles. In the
context of jury establishment of damages, meanwhile, precedent plays no part.
Reported decisions consider only general principles or approaches; there is no
systematic basis for providing juries or judges with quantified data concerning
previous analogous cases. The system proceeds on the erroneous assumption
that each case is entirely unique, that treatment of other, similar cases has no
bearing on the outcome of the case under consideration.
Not surprisingly, broad jury discretion and the absence of clear standards
make very large awards possible and allow for considerable variation among
awards. 7 This has led some critics to characterize the entire process as a
"lottery," which plaintiffs are encouraged to play for the (uncertain) prospect
of a "jackpot" recovery."5 Other critics have argued that the system of civil
liability is out of control, compensating claims far too generously. 19 Some
proposed reforms would make major changes in the traditions of individualized
justice that have characterized the tort system.
It is our view that the problems identified by the more radical reformers
and discussed above are not trivial. Variation in damage awards for similarly
severe injuries encourages divergences in parties' valuation of cases, thus
impeding settlements and contributing to the very high cost of administering
the system.20 Poor predictability may also hurt insurance availability and raise
premiums.21 Such inconsistency, once disclosed by empirical findings, also
undercuts the perceived fairness and social legitimacy of the system.22
17. See generally Bovbjerg, Sloan, & Blumstein, supra note 2, at 909-17, 919-24; accord Jaffee,
Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219 (1953); W.
BLUM & H. KALVEN, PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROBLEM (1965).
18. See J. O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTTERY 8-9 (1979).
19. See, e.g., P. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988).
20. Given the vagueness of the law of damages, considerable random error is to be expected from
jury to jury. This may impede settlements and thereby increase litigation cost. See, e.g., Wittman, Dispute
Resolution, Bargaining, and the Selection of Cases for Trial: A Study of the Generation of Biased and
Unbiased Data, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 313 (1988) (with risk-neutral disputants); but see Fournier & Zuehlke,
Litigation and Settlement: An Empirical Approach, 71 REV. ECON. STAT. 189 (1989) (variance in awards
promote settlements if disputants risk averse). According to recent evidence on litigation costs in personal
injury cases, plaintiffs' net compensation was 52% of total costs in automobile cases, only 43% in other
cases. See J. KAKALIK & N. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION xiii (Rand Corp.
Inst. for Civ. Just. 1986).
21. See, e.g., Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern TortLaw, 96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1987).
22. British courts, which have in the last 50 years transformed their approach to calculating damages,
cite three key goals of reforming the process: ease of calculation, consistency across cases, and
predictability (to promote settlements and maintain insurability). See, e.g., Ward v. James, 11966] 1 Q.B.
273, 299-300 (C.A.). See generally J. MUNKMAN, DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY AND DEATH 186-93
Vol. 8: 171, 1990
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II. A "Common Law" Of Damages And Presumptive Scheduling
Experience in valuation establishes a frame of reference for decisionma-
king. For valuing personal injuries, current law offers only vague, qualitative
formulations that describe in general terms what types of damages are awar-
dable. This leaves a great deal to, and places a premium on, the presentations
by the parties.23 At trial, enormous amounts of relevant information and
expertise are introduced as evidence, but without a context within which to
evaluate them. Notably lacking is any institutionalized frame of reference or
quantitative framework within which factfinders may assess damages.
For the substantive rules of tort liability, judges learn from experience by
reasoning from case to case and following precedent rather than beginning each
case anew.24 Grand jurors also sit for some time, considering numerous cases
as they decide which are serious enough to warrant prosecution. They too
develop some sense of perspective through experience.
Not so the petit jury. To set damages in individual cases, the law looks to
inexperienced, one-time jurors and does not give them access to the experience
of prior juries.25 Decisions need context. Yet jurors receive only the most
generalized guidelines for valuation by which to choose between polarized
presentations of trained advocates. They have no frame of reference regarding
prior experience on which to draw. Further, no systematic, official record is
now kept of factfinders' deliberations or findings to help inform future deci-
sions.6 Although some institutional memory resides in trial judges' loose
oversight of jury awards and the small share of appealed cases that become
(8th ed. 1989). See also infra note 33 and accompanying text.
23. See generally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES (1973); Bovbjerg, Sloan, &
Blumstein, supra note 2, at 909-17.
24. E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949) provides a classic description.
25. Prior assessments in similar cases are not admissible evidence in a case, nor are advocates allowed
to base arguments on them. Annotation, Propriety and Prejudicial Effect of Reference by Counsel in Civil
Case to Amount of Verdict in Similar Cases, 15 A.L.R.3d 1144, 1146 (1967).
26. Sources of information do exist but they are neither universal, complete, nor official. Private jury
verdict reporters may come reasonably close to completeness, but most publish only a selection of briefly
described cases, as voluntarily Submitted by lawyers. Such self-reporting of verdicts poses issues of biased
selection and characterization of cases. This characterization stems from experience with coding from
several reporters. See M. SHANLEY & M. PETERSON, COMPARATIVE JUSTICE: CIVIL JURY VERDICTS IN
SAN FRANCISCO AND COOK COUNTIES, 1959-1980, at 79-88 (Rand Corp. No. R-3006-1CJ, 1983). The
amount, quality, and format of information given varies by case, and there is little, if any, analysis of
trends. Cases may be indexed by type (e.g., contract dispute, auto, medical malpractice) or by broad
category of injury, but systematic tabulations are rare. The national service does give average and median
awards, but neither provides cross tabulations or controlled analyses of results. Cf. Localio, Variations
on $962,258: 7he Misuse of Data on Medical Malpractice, 13 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 126 (1985)
(criticizes selective use of data). Lawyers have recourse to other published listings of prior awards,
especially those approved on appeal, from various sources. However, these sources tend to present an even
more selected body of cases, with even less information about each case. See, e.g., R. HARLEY & M.
MAGEE, WHAT'S IT WORTH? A GUIDE TO CURRENT PERSONAL INJURY AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS (4th
ed. 1987); M. BELLI, 5 MODERN TRIALS §§ 67.1-67.10 (2d ed. 1982); 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages §§ 293-
397 (1988) (each with prior damage amounts, organized by part of body affected).
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reported appellate decisions," juries could benefit from more help in setting
damages. Judges also need better standards by which to review the reasonable-
ness of awards. All of the parties and attorneys involved deserve more predict-
ability, as do the insurers who ultimately finance payments and must set
premium rates far in advance. The main purpose of keeping better information
on past awards would be to improve the accuracy of damage determinations.
A side benefit would be to compare the outcomes before different judges and
courts. Tracking results in civil cases could identify patterns just as investi-
gations of patterns in criminal sentencing preceded action on sentencing
there.2"
Factfinders making damage awards should act somewhat more like judges
deciding points of law, and they should similarly get more guidance from the
prior experience of their peers. An institutionalized frame of reference would
help one-time juries determine where in the spectrum of prior experience their
case fits and would guide attorneys in negotiating about damages.
A. Using Prior Awards as Precedent: A Proposal
Our proposal has three key features. First, more explicit and objective
standards should guide decisions on damages. Factfinders should explain more
about how they arrived at their result: What was the injury? What were the
plaintiff's circumstances and the characteristics of his losses (leaving aside for
the moment how to define these matters)? Where tort payments are ordered
for bodily injury or death, factfinders should explain their findings and the
standards they have applied, not merely announce the total damages awarded.
This increased openness would improve the objectivity and predictability of
results and would contribute to greater general confidence in the tort
system.29
Second, decisions on damages should be officially recorded, both at trial
and on appeal. The judiciary or some other public agency should maintain the
requisite reporting system to compile these data. All cases of bodily injury and
of death should be recorded, because the rules of damages are the same across
types of cases. Prior results should be analyzed, and information on the spec-
trum of prior damage awards should be provided to juries, judges, or both,
as an aid to decisionmaking.
Third, the middle range of prior awards of a similar nature should be given
"presumptive" validity. That is, awards that fall in the middle range of the
27. Cf. Precopio v. Detroit Dep't of Transp., 415 Mich. 457, 330 N.W. 2d 802 (1982) (reviews prior
awards, notes value of computers for such recordkeeping).
28. See generally Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989) (on federal guidelines for
sentencing to reduce variation). For a review of the history of such guidelines and their value as an analogy
for civil cases, see Levin, supra note 2. See also infra note 63.
29. This feature is adhered to in Britain. See supra note 22 and infra note 33.
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distribution should be deemed presumptively valid. In contrast, where valua-
tions in a case differ significantly from prior results, tort valuations should be
subject to both a burden of explanation by the jury and heightened review by
the court. For extreme awards (for example, those in the top or the bottom
quartile),3" juries should identify specific factors that justify the variation."
An unexplained outlier should constitute a prima facie case for either remittitur
or additur32 by the trial judge or an appellate holding of inadequacy or exces-
siveness of the judgment.
Our general common-law-of-damages approach to some extent resembles
the evolution of judicial assessment of damages in Britain. In Britain, where
personal injuries have come to be tried almost exclusively by judges rather than
juries, trial judges are far more explicit about amounts of loss awarded under
each "head" of damages. Especially with regard to non-pecuniary loss, they
are explicitly guided-although not bound-by amounts approved in prior
cases, and judicial review can more readily keep the "quantum" of damages
consistent among like cases.33
Our presumptive scheduling approach also, to a limited extent, resembles
the British model, except that we propose more systematic use of information
by juries as well as judges. The British apparently view their approach as
taking judicial notice of prior valuations rather than as binding judicial prece-
dent.3" Our proposal calls for similarly non-binding information, but its intent
is to create a presumptive benchmark. In this regard, our approach is more
analogous to the federal criminal sentencing guidelines, which also provide a
presumptive schedule of -punishment from which judges can only deviate by
30. We suggest these limits to avoid any change in fully half of all cases; other levels could be chosen
instead.
31. It cannot now be stated with assurance what factors are reasonable, only what already reported
factors, such as age of claimant, have influenced prior awards. We anticipate that a common law process
will evolve to address the issue of proper and improper factors. For empirical analyses of determinants
of awards, see, e.g., Danzon & Lillard, Settlement Out of Court: The Disposition of Medical Malpractice
Claims, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 345 (1983); Viscusi, Product Liability Litigation with Risk Aversion, 17 J.
LEGAL STUD. 101 (1988); Sloan & Hsieh, Variability in Medical Malpractice Payments: Is the Compensa-
tion Fair? 24 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 601 (1990).
32. See generally J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.4 (1985); S.
SPEISER, C. KRAUSE & A. GANS, AM. LAW TORTS § 8:41 (1985). Additur is apparently not available in
federal courts under the prevailing view of the Seventh Amendment's right-to-jury-trial guarantee. See
Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935). On remittur, see Note, Remittur Practice in the Federal Courts,
76 COLUM. L. REV. 299 (1976).
33. See generally J. MUNKMAN, supra note 22; H. McGREGOR, MCGREGOR ON DAMAGES (15th ed.
1988); P. CANE, ATIYAH'S ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW (4th ed. 1987); D. KEMP & M.
KEMP, THE QUANTUM OF DAMAGES IN PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS (1954). Interestingly, even in France,
where damages are seen as much more a matter of fact than of law and where lower court judges exercise
almost unfettered discretion in setting amounts, recent legislation has called for greater uniformity in motor
vehicle damages, with administratively set guidelines. See V. GENEVIEVE & B. MARKESINis, LA REPARA-
TION Du DOMMAGE CORPOREL: ESSAI DE COMPARAISON DE DROrrS ANGLASI ET FRANCAIS 72 (1985).
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reference to factors not included in the calculus used by the scheduling
ranges."
1. A Comprehensive Reporting System
The core of the proposal is the reporting system to record the newly
specific awards.36 It must be created before the rest of this proposal can be
implemented.
A recent federal malpractice task force proposed a "damage award data
base" and state "compensation guidelines" meant to advise judges about prior
medical malpractice awards to help decide on additur or remittitur.37 We
propose to cover all personal injuries generically, normalizing awards across
types of cases so as to eliminate any disparity of treatment in different
cases.
38
Even if the system were to cover all torts, however, some smaller states
might lack enough cases to maintain statistically credible amounts of informa-
tion. These states could pool data with similar, perhaps neighboring states,
even though substantive law varies somewhat by state, since controlled com-
parisons would be instructive. The alternative, national reporting, would
capture the benefits of scale economies in information gathering and manage-
ment yet still allow for reporting data by state, region or locality.39
What information should the reporting system contain? For verdicts, the
following items should be reported and tabulated: (a) nature and extent of
injuries; (b) some finding on each element of pecuniary damage that the law
recognizes for the case such as past wages, medical, and other losses; the value
of future wages, medical, and other losses; assumptions about future inflation
of such losses and discount rate chosen4" to bring future losses to present
value; (c) types of noneconomic losses and total dollars allowed for them; and
35. See sources cited supra note 28 and infra note 63.
36. Given that liability and damages are primarily matters of state law, gathering such information
is a natural administrative function for state judiciaries. Federal courts, under Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938), can rely on the information applicable in the state whose law they apply.
37. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
MEDICAL LIABILITY AND MALPRACTICE (August 1987) (Section 14 of the task force's proposed model
statute, The Model Health Care Provider Liability Reform Act).
38. Cf. ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM, TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE
OF INJURY 13-1 to 13-3 (1984) (proposal for broad data collection agency on injuries and injury-causing
events to keep statistics on injury, economic loss, grievance resolution, and insurance with no provision
for judicial use).
39. One national data .bank on medical malpractice claims and disciplinary actions has just begun.
See Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, Title IV, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,101-
11,152 (1990); Cohn, At Last, a Data Bank Tracks Problem Doctors, Washington Post, Sept. 4, 1990
(Health), at 17.
40. For one analysis of the interaction between forecasts of nominal economic loss and choice of the
discount rate, see Jones, Inflation Rates Implicit in Discounting Personal Injury Economic Losses? 52 J.
RISK & INS. 144 (1985).
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(d) adjustments made for comparative negligence, prior settlements by other
defendants, joint and several liability, or other factors. Where awards are
judicially altered or upheld on review, the new results should be noted.4 It
would be prudent to include a short qualitative description of each case as well;
statistically unusual cases often seem less odd when their context is clearer.
We do not suggest including information on settlements because, for a
public system which should focus foremost on public determinations, this could
be burdensome and hard to enforce. Moreover, data on settlements would be
less reliable than values set in court. Settling parties need not make formal
findings and could readily skew the data through questionable characteriza-
42tion.
2. Using Data on Prior Findings
a. Simple Attention to Outliers
Information from prior awards can be used to set boundaries by which to
identify extreme values for cases of any given severity of injury. 43 We sug-
gest using as boundaries the 25th and 75th percentiles of prior valuations,
although other percentiles could be chosen. Each year the agency maintaining
41. In April 1989, Tennessee enacted legislation that requires civil clerks and masters to report the
following data monthly to the Judicial Council: "(1) The number of cases filed claiming money damages
for personal injury or death; (2) The number of such cases actually proceeding to trial; and (3) For each
such case actually proceeding to trial, the number of cases in which the plaintiffwas awarded some money
damages for personal injury or death, the amount of the verdict given in a jury case, the amount of
judgment in a case without a jury, and any additur or remittitur awarded in the case by the trial judge."
TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-21-11 (Supp. 1990). The Tennessee Judicial Council is to develop a reporting
form, compile the data, and report on findings annually. The Tennessee law marks a good beginning. To
implement our proposal, reporting legislation would need to call for additional, more detailed data on the
nature and the extent of injury.
42. One may argue that reliable information should be compiled on past settlements because they
resolve by far the largest share of cases and because changes in settlement practice may affect types of cases
going to trial and verdict. Having data on past settlements would also facilitate future pretrial negotiations
because it would inform negotiators better than the comprehensive existing write-ups in private reporters.
Settlement information could also be useful to liability insurers for developing loss profiles on individual
applicants for coverage. Currently, there is no mechanism for pooling information across insurers.
If included in the data base, settlement data should not include the same level of detail as jury verdicts
because settlements cut short the process of investigation and seek economical solutions rather than precise
findings. New reporting requirements would also be needed for settlements which are not now a matter
of public record. Reporting requirements could be imposed on lawyers as part of their obligation to courts.
Alternatively, the primary obligation could be placed on liability insurers since most defendants are insured;
some states already require rather elaborate insurance reports on closed claims for medical malpractice.
See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 11,555.2 (West 1988) (aggregate statistics required on exposure claims
experience); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-6-1 (Burns 1990) (must report on all dispositions of individual
claims within 60 days of closure); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.912 (Supp. 1989) (same). These reports could
form the foundation of the proposed information bank, along with other forms of liability insurance.
43. For a description of a severity-of-injury scale, see infra text accompanying notes 48-50. Our
assumption is that juries would be expected to decide on the severity-of-injury in terms of such a scale and
that the presumptive damages schedule would then apply to cases in those specific severity categories.
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the reporting system would calculate these amounts, adjusting all prior awards
for extent of comparative negligence and for inflation.
We suggest that these boundaries be included as part of the jury instructions
but not entered as evidence. If jurors specified an amount of damages above
or below these scheduled boundaries (before any reduction for comparative
negligence), they would have to provide particular justification for the
deviation.' The judge would then consider whether the explanation was
persuasive.
At what stage should jurors be given boundary amounts, and should they
get the complete set for all severities or only those applicable to the severity
of injury in their case? If boundary amounts were given at the beginning of
jury deliberations, they would have to include a complete set for all severities,
for severity is a jury question not to be pre-empted by the judge who gives the
boundaries. Yet a jury given the full set could decide severity of injury on the
basis of the dollar value it wanted to achieve, either to evade the seeming
restraints on its discretion, or to avoid having to explain its reasoning.4"
Under such a process, the jury could game the system in specifying what
severity it chose, and the proposal would not work as intended.
This type of jury behavior could be prevented by use of a process of
sequential jury deliberation. First, the jury would decide liability issues and
the general severity of injury. There would be no need to explain the boun-
daries in cases of no liability. Given a finding of liability, including compara-
tive negligence, the judge would provide quantitative guidance on the jury's
finding of damages by giving only the two relevant boundary amounts .46 The
judge could readily oversee the result. Alternatively, the jury could proceed
as usual, but with the additional instruction to specify the severity of injury
as part of its verdict. Only the judge would be given the boundaries of extreme
values for use as a guide to additur or remittitur. In any case, the standards
for intervention by the judge should be strengthened. Extreme values should
constitute a prima facie case for post-verdict adjustment. A judge who does
44. The jury would explain extreme values by reference to the same qualitative standards they have
traditionally been given in addition to the evidence introduced about the specific nature and extent of both
economic and noneconomic damages. Under this proposed system, advocates would surely present a case
on relative injury by severity category. It does not seem desirable for advocates to present evidence
comparing an instant case with details of prior cases; however, see infra note 53, which considers reasons
for giving the jury or judge more detailed information about prior results.
45. See Bovbjerg, Sloan & Blumstein, supra note 2, at 962-63 (problem of "bottom line" oriented
jury). Cf. Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 158, 161
(1958) (juries seldom make awards on an item-by-item basis, usually arriving at a dollar amount without
detailed analysis). On the appropriate role of the jury, see also infra text accompanying notes 53-59.
46. This proposal departs from traditional practice, but not as much as would routine bifurcated trials.
The proposed sequential process of jury decisionmaking would occur within the framework of a unitary
trial, encompassing all evidence on liability and damages in a single proceeding.
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not adjust an extreme award to the 25th or 75th percentile level should provide
a written explanation.47
A nine-point severity-of-injury scale has been used extensively in empirical
analysis." A similar scale readily could be explained to juries.49 The scale
varies from injuries involving only emotional injuries (level 1) to death (level
9) and distinguishes among levels of temporary and permanent physical injury
in between (levels 2-8). Although the variation in payment within a severity-of-
injury category is large, mean payments (settlements and awards at verdict)
rise systematically from lower to higher values on the scale.50 Factors other
than severity of injury could be used to categorize injuries and calculate where
the extreme boundaries lie,51 but severity is the most important determinant
of value. Moreover, some of the factors that may explain the actual level of
past awards may lack legal and social legitimacy and should not be used in any
system of presumptively valid awards, regardless of their actual impact on past
awards.52
This boundary approach seems likely to curb the occurrence of extreme
"outliers" that are, among other things, quite newsworthy and tend to hurt
public perceptions of judicial fairness. However, within the central range of
47. Judges now have virtually no standards other than common sense by which to judge inadequacy
or excessiveness and, in any case, are expected to intervene only in very unusual circumstances. See, e.g.,
J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE, & A. MILLER, supra note 32. At least one tort reform has already sought to
encourage more intervention by judges on damages, altering and codifying the common law of remittitur
and additur. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.74 (Supp. 1990) (court required to review malpractice jury
verdicts under new standard of clear excessiveness or inadequacy in light of evidence).
48. See, e.g., P. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 21
(1985); Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 31; Bovbjerg, Sloan, & Blumstein, supra note 2, at 921.
49. An alternative scale used to assess severity of injuries from motor vehicle accidents has six severity
levels, the sixth being death. This scale differentiates among injuries according to the threat they pose to
life. See Miller & Luchter, Crash Costs and Safety Investment, 21 Acc. ANAL. & PREY. 303 (1989).
Research experience shows that modestly trained abstractors agree on the application of the nine-point
scale's simple criteria in almost all cases, although some line-drawing ambiguities exist. For a critique of
AM. MED. ASS'N., GUIDE TO THE EVALUATION OF PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT (1988), see Pryor, Book
Review, 103 HARv. L. REV. 964 (1990).
50. See P. DANZON, supra note 48, at 41; Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 31; and Bovbjerg, Sloan, &
Blumstein, supra note 2.
51. See Bovbjerg, Sloan, & Blumstein, supra note 2, at 939-42. See also Sloan & Hsieh, supra note
31. Statistical analysis confirms that almost 40% of the case-by-case variation in one major state's (Florida)
malpractice payments is explained by the nine-point severity scale. Many other presumably causative
factors, such as age of claimant, show far weaker relationships. Over time, various factors affecting awards
could be tracked for their importance and then added to the presumptive validity system if deemed
appropriate. However, it is important that relatively few objective factors be used, lest the system become
unduly complex and confusing to apply.
52. For example, results by racial category would be unacceptable. See generally, K. ABRAHAM,
DISTRIBUTING RISK 76 (1986). Type of case (for example, malpractice, products liability, auto tort) is not
a factor in the substantive law of damages. Therefore, it probably should not be a factor in the proposed
quantitative common law of awards-even though juries vary in generosity in different types of cases for
injuries to plaintiffs of seemingly similar characteristics. See, e.g., Bovbjerg, Sloan, Dor & Hsieh, supra
note 7; M. SHANLEY & M. PETERSON, supra note 26, at 50-74. The type of legal allegation explains some
of the observed variation in payments to claimants in medical malpractice cases. See Sloan & Hsieh, supra
note 31. However, allegation is more directly pertinent in determining liability than damages. Sloan and
Hsieh found that the claimant's sex had no effect on payments in medical malpractice cases.
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presumptive validity, juries might be tempted to move toward one or the other
of the extreme values based on emotion or other extraneous factors. Requiring
juries to specify the elements of an award and increasing the trial judge's
authority for oversight would probably help combat such tendencies."3
To summarize, juries would need to find liability first, independently from
damages, as they are meant to under a conventional regime. No liability, of
course, would mean no award and no need to consider precedent on damages.
Where liability was found, juries would determine damages using the presump-
tive schedule of information on past awards in a conceptually distinct and
temporally sequential portion of the same unitary proceeding.
b. The Appropriate Roles of Jury and Judge
A major issue to consider is whether the jury should be given boundary
amounts for use in its deliberations or whether only the judge should have such
information, as an input in the trial judge's traditional oversight of a jury deci-
sion. 4 Traditionally, jurors have been sheltered from information on prior
awards, or at least from advocates' argumentation based on selective compari-
sons. Critics of providing additional information to juries fear that juries
burdened with extra information may become confused or overly emotional,
to the prejudice of plaintiff or defendant. 5  We note, however, that simple
boundary amounts officially computed and explained by the judge would be
53. Another approach would be to give jurors information about the typical past cases valued at the
25th and 75th percentiles, which would go beyond the simple use of boundaries to address outliers. Cf.
Bovbjerg, Sloan & Blumstein, supra note 2, at 953-56 (use of multi-attribute descriptive "scenarios" to
aid in jury valuation of pain and suffering). In general, more detailed findings from the ever larger data
base of valuations could be used to explain to juries what other legitimate factors have been statistically
related to levels of awards. Such information could potentially help the jury understand how their case
compares with the norm and what factors might justify valuations above or below the boundary amounts.
We would urge caution, however, on giving juries statistical information (for example, the extent to which
higher medical bills generally lead to higher total awards) to compare with the direct evidence that a jury
should weigh in a particular case (for example, this plaintiff's particular medical bills). The purpose of
the proposal is not to supplant case-specific fact finding, but rather to put reasonable bounds on the resulting
values. Perhaps only judges or appellate courts should have access to more detailed outputs from the
reporting system's data.
54. A subsidiary issue is whether information on prior awards should be admissible into evidence.
An analogy is that many state statutes on pre-trial screening panels allow admission of panel findings on
the issue of liability or damages (the latter in the lesser number of panels that make findings on damages).
E.g, NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.003-069 (Supp. 1988). Bringing the schedule in as evidence would allow
advocates to argue about it and to submit countervailing evidence. The alternative is to make such
information available only as a matter of law and jury instruction. Possibly, a court-appointed, neutral
expert might be called upon to explicate the particular aspects of the schedule relative to a very difficult
case.
55. E.g., Luth v. Rogers & Babler Construction Co., 507 P.2d 761, 768 (Alaska 1973); Brewer v.
Payless Stations, Inc., 412 Mich. 673, 677-79, 316 N.W.2d 702, 705 (1982).
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quite different. Also, we note again that this proposal could be implemented
through judges alone without involving juries.56
Nevertheless, we propose to rely more on juries. The arguments against
juries prove too much. Even under this proposal, juries have enormous discre-
tion to make the most fundamental decisions about liability, causation, and
damages. They therefore must be considered trustworthy.57 If jurors are
incompetent or untrustworthy, society should not rely on them as it does and
should move personal injury disputes to another forum either by statute or
constitutional amendment.
Moreover, there are reasons for confidence in jurors' capabilities to weigh
complex information.58 Hence, we vote to improve jury decisionmaking rather
than to override or supplant it. Judge and jury should share responsibility along
traditional lines. The jury should hear the evidence on each case's specific
circumstances, then weigh it within the confines set by certain information
from prior awards. The judge should provide this information concerning prior
awards in the form of jury instructions. The judge should then act as a check
against unreasonableness on the part of a jury, as judges do now, but with new
standards for intervention.59
B. Implementation
The key element in moving to the proposed system is the compilation of
information. Because the process needs a budget to operate, the legislature
must be involved, at least to appropriate funds. Most tort reforms are under-
standably legislative; the balancing of interests involved naturally leads one
to think of a legislative arena. However, legislative reforms can be imple-
mented by hybrid entities. For example, federal and state sentencing reforms
were carried out by commission.60 We thus suggest that the original data
could be compiled by a commission based in the judiciary or with judges as
members.61 Once operational, the information bank could advise juries and
judges on an ongoing basis.
56. See the proposal by the United States Department of Health and Human Services task force, supra
note 37. Courts that have struck down judge-applied caps as a denial of the right to jury trial might be
hostile to a presumptive schedule enforced by judges through remittitur and additur. Compare Sofie v.
Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989) (cap invalid), with Etheridge v. Medical Centers Hosps.
376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989) (cap upheld).
57. Not only are juries given extraordinary discretion to find facts, but state constitutions also explicitly
protect the right to trial by jury. It has been held inappropriate for judges to circumscribe juries' judgments
with legislatively mandated limits after the fact. See Bovbjerg, Sloan & Blumstein, supra note 2, at 972-74.
58. For a ringing defense of juries' capabilities, see Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA.
L. REV. 1055 (1964).
59. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
60. See Mistretta v. United States, supra note 28.
61. See id.
Yale Journal on Regulation
C. Constitutionality
Although we make no pretense of providing a full constitutional analysis
of the presumptive scheduling proposal, it is appropriate to present a thumbnail
sketch of the constitutional issues that might be raised and their likely resolu-
tion. Tort reforms have foundered constitutionally in some jurisdictions under
various state constitutional provisions.62 It therefore would be prudent to
consider the constitutional issues as part of the initial presentation of the
proposal.
The proposed system of presumptive scheduling has several advantageous
features that assist in resisting constitutional attack.63 First, it is neither man-
datory nor invasive of the functions of jury and judge. Rather it is advisory,
flexible, and self-correcting. Second, the proposal is fair and treats the extreme
cases symmetrically, whether they are high or low. By giving plaintiff and
defendant information to bring their valuations of claims closer together, it
conserves judicial resources by encouraging settlement of all cases. Finally,
it is not a "take away" of plaintiffs' traditional prerogatives. Even though it
would create thoroughgoing change, the idea of a common law of damages is
a far less intrusive and more equitable mode of improving predictability of
damage awards than are other reforms already imposed on courts and juries
by legislatures. It is also far less intrusive than some other proposals.64 The
latter reforms include wholesale rewriting of common law damage rules
through caps on damages and requirements of collateral source offset.65
The proposal demonstrably has a rational and even substantial relationship
to many valid legislative interests: keeping liability insurance available, prom-
oting fairness of awards for claims of all sizes, and maintaining public confid-
ence in the judicial system. It should readily pass muster in those states that
62. See generally B numstein & Smith, Constitutional Attacks on Medical Malpractice Laws, in LEGAL
LIABILITY AND QuALrY AssuRANcE IN NEWBORN SCREENING 167 (L. Andrews ed. 1985); Bovbjerg,
Sloan, & Blumstein, supra note 2, at 969-74.
63. The traditionally great variability in criminal sentencing from judge to judge has raised concerns
analogous to those that underlie the presumptive scheduling proposal. In response, there has been a
movement toward mandatory minimum sentencing in certain cases, and toward "scheduled" sentences
computed from characteristics of the crime and the convicted criminal. For a general discussion of issues,
see Moore & Miethe, Regulated and Unregulated Sentencing Decisions: An Analysis ofFirst-Year Practices
under Minnesota's Felony Sentencing Guidelines, 20 LAW & Soc'Y. REV. 253 (1986); see also supra note
28.
64. For a proposal suggesting drastic curbing of jury discretion in valuation, see Slatter, Civil Jury
System Requires a Fresh Look, MANHATTAN LAWYER 12 (Dec. 12-18, 1989) (jury to hear arguments on
damages, then award either the precise amount sought by the plaintiff or that specified by the defense).
That plan is provocative, but such a final-offer rule seems better suited for promoting settlement, as
suggested infra notes 107-116, than for promoting accurate jury valuation.
65. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2 (Burns 1988) (cap); IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.136 (West
Supp. 1988) (collateral sources).
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have accepted more intrusive limits on jury decisions, especially caps on
awards or their pain and suffering component.6"
Presumptive validity for middle-range verdicts would not deny the right
to a jury trial. It would create no limit on jurors' right to hear and weigh all
relevant evidence, but would tailor the recovery to the circumstances, as the
present system does. Jury findings would be more important than before
because they would influence future cases. The reporting system and presump-
tive scheduling would provide only procedural and advisory information, not
substantively rigid and binding limits. Although the proposal calls for more
work from juries, it would be no more exacting than the requirements of
special verdicts which are an accepted means of encouraging careful
deliberations.67 The proposal would change traditional judicial practice and
the deliberations of the jury even less if implemented by giving the boundary
amounts only to the judge as a guide to additur and remittitur. 8
The shortcomings of some of the other tort reform proposals do not seem
to be present here.69 This proposal does not discriminate against large cases,
as some courts have held the caps to do. It applies across the board, rather
than singling out medical malpractice alone for reform.7" It does not take
away common law rights without a quid pro quo, which has been found to be
constitutionally required in some jurisdictions.71 Finally, the proposal does
not depend for its justification on the existence of a "crisis" in malpractice or
other liability insurance in the jurisdiction.' For these reasons, the presump-
tive scheduling proposal would not appear to suffer from the constitutional
66. See, e.g., Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368
(1985), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2 (Bums 1988); Johnson v.
St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. 1980) (upholding entire reform statute). For a longer
discussion of the validity of caps and other measures to reduce variability of nonpecuniary awards, see also
Bovbjerg, Sloan, & Blumstein, supra note 2, at 698-74.
67. In one way, the proposal can be seen as merely calling for special verdicts in half of jury cases.
68. A judge's imposition of fixed limits on jury awards after the fact, unlike these boundary guidelines,
has sometimes been held unconstitutional on breach-of-jury-trial grounds. See cases cited supra note 56.
See also Bovbjerg, Sloan & Blumstein, supra note 2, at 972-74.
69. At least one state court has overturned malpractice-specific tort reform on the rationale that specific
provisions of such legislation may interfere with the judiciary's inherent right to control its own process.
Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978). If such unusual and troubling reasoning were applied
to the more balanced reform here, presumptive scheduling might have to occur through judicial initiative
instead of legislation. Certainly the common law has evolved, new approaches to computing damages as
well as new procedures. For example, in some complex cases today, notably products liability class actions,
claims are handled outside the conventional judicial process by using rough schedules to compute damages.
In order to be fairer to claimants and to build public confidence in the predictability and rationality of the
tort system, it is not implausible that United States courts could embrace within the common law of damages
a presumptively valid schedule based on prior decisions. British courts have evolved such an approach to
damages. See supra notes 22 & 33.
70. The failure to apply equally to all similar suits for damages was a shortcoming cited in several
decisions invalidating 1970s malpractice tort reform, some citing special state constitutional provisions.
See generally Blumstein & Smith, supra note 62; Bovbjerg, Sloan, & Blumstein, supra note 2, at 969-74.
71. See Bovbjerg, Sloan & Blumstein, supra note 2, at 971 n.264.
72. See Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
914 (1977); Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983).
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infirmities that have, in some jurisdictions, resulted in the invalidation of more
one-sided and heavy-handed tort reforms.
III. Insurance Contracts For Future Services
Bills for future care, including medical, custodial, and other services, are
an important part of personal injury awards." Even though larger cases are
not resolved until a relatively long time after an injury, future medical services
and other care often remain to be covered. Serious injuries may require lengthy
courses of reparative surgery or even long-term care if they lead to a disabling
or chronic condition. Where lifetime care is necessary, the sums involved can
be very large. Compensation must cover not only medical care but also social
services, nursing, feeding, rehabilitation, and other expenses. For example,
with respect to care for a severity "8" case-permanent grave injury, including
quadriplegia, severe brain damage, or lifelong care-it is not implausible to
expect to spend $40,000 or more a year on care. Thirty annual payments of
$40,000 discounted at 5% have a present value of $615,000. 74
Future costs of services are hard to project. The price of medical care has
risen at almost twice the general inflation rate since 1950"5 and inflation is
sensitive to public policies implemented. In contrast, losses in earnings are
easier to project, at least for someone with an earnings history and known
prospects before an injury.
Currently, to compensate plaintiffs for the cost of care, experts compute
the sum of past cost (perhaps with interest) and the anticipated cost of future
services (typically discounted to present value).76 Traditionally, this value has
been paid as a lump sum, which allows successful plaintiffs to control their
own funds and motivates them to economize on care. 7 However, they receive
no information or bargaining power to help them obtain the "best deal" for
their money. They also are not sheltered from unexpected changes in health
status related to the original tort. Moreover, from a more paternalistic view-
point, they may be impoverished through their own or others' improvidence,
ineffective management, or duplicity.
73. Danzon, supra note 48, at 171, estimates that medical losses account for 37.5% of reported
economic loss in malpractice cases, wage loss 58.4%, and other losses 4.0%. However, future medical
losses seem to be under-reported. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, MALPRAC-
TICE CLAIMS: FINAL COMPILATION 48 (1980) (source of Danzon data). For the very largest cases, medical
losses were double wage loss. Id. at 51, Table 2.6.
74. Such calculations are very sensitive to the rates of inflation and discount assumed. Cf. Frankel
v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd., 466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972) (at that time,
institutionalization cost $27,375 per year for permanent brain damage).
75. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1988, at 450 (108th ed. 1987).
76. See generally M. BROObKSHIRE, ECONOMIC DAMAGES: THE HANDBOOK FOR PLAINTIFF AND
DEFENSE ATTORNEYS (1987). Not all jurisdictions require discounting.
77. Cf. W. LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 46-47 (1987).
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Increasingly, large future damages are paid as a "structured" award in the
form of an annuity-like contract to provide specified periodic payments in the
future.78 Promoting such periodic payments has become a popular form of
tort reform and has resulted in benefits for the parties involved.79 Periodic
payments relieve the defendant of the duty to pay large lump-sum cash awards
in the year of the final judgment. The obligations become long-term, recurring
payments, which are easier to plan for and to manage financially. The
technique allows defendants and their insurance carriers to reduce the "lumpi-
ness" of large cash outlays and to convert the judgment into smaller annual
obligations. Also, a market-determined cost for the structured annuity payment
is preferable to a factfinder's estimate of future inflation and appropriate
discount rates.
In addition, if fairly adjusted for inflation, periodic payments have some
paternalistic benefits for plaintiffs. As long as payors remain financially viable,
plaintiffs are protected from either their own financial mismanagement or the
mismanagement or chicanery of fiduciaries. Moreover, society has an interest
in assuring that a conservatively calculated annual stream of payments
continues, even if the successful but disabled plaintiff is a risk-taker and
willing to plunge into high-risk, potentially high-return investment instru-
ments.80
Nevertheless, periodic payments present some important drawbacks. The
plaintiff loses control over the capital. Often, the stream of payments is not
adjusted for inflation and does not account for unforeseen changes in a victim's
health status associated with the original tort. Moreover, the compensation goal
of tort law is, ultimately, related to the victim's long-term welfare. Dollar
78. See, e.g., Glen, Periodic Payment ofPersonal Injury Damages, in DEALING WITH DAMAGES 45-62
(N. Itzkoff ed. 1983). See also infra note 79.
79. See MODEL PERIODIC PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS ACT §§ 1-20, 14 U.L.A. 141 (1980). Compare
Henderson, Periodic Payments of Bodily Injury Awards, 66 A.B.A. J. 734 (1980) (favors) with Corboz,
Structured Injustice: Compulsory Periodic Payment of Judgments, 66 A.B.A. J. 1524 (1980) (opposes).
Structured settlements appear to be allowable everywhere by agreement of the parties, but by statute they
may be required or imposed at the option of the judge (or sometimes of a defendant) where future damages
are large. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (West 1988) (mandating structured award at request
of party for future damages above $50,000; held constitutional in American Bank & Trust Co. v.
Community Hosp. of Las Gatos, 36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984)); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 507-C:7 (1983) (providing discretionary plan; held unconstitutional in Carson v. Maurer,
120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980)). Lawyers' fees and expenses are typically subtracted before the
remainder of the award is structured.
80. By definition, disabled tort victims are likely to be somewhat dependent. Society surely has an
interest in protecting itself against the consequences of a successful plaintiffs potential profligacy with a
lump sum that typically would be an enormous amount of cash for an average person. Even a nonprofligate
plaintiffmight gamble in investing his cash recovery on the assumption that any financial "freefall" would
be cushioned by the social safety net put in place for a very different purpose (such as the federal disability
program and various state programs of income and medical care assistance for the disabled and impecu-
nious). Insofar as society should be able to guard against this kind of free-riding behavior, it clearly has
an interest in the kind of paternalism reflected in the process of assuring an annual stream of income
through periodic payments.
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awards serve as a proxy, a convenient but imperfect estimate of the value or
cost of purchasing services necessitated by the original tort. Tort damages
awards are input measures used for approximating the cost of purchasing the
services needed to restore the victim as nearly as possible to the status quo or
to offset additional costs associated with the injury. Damage awards are only
effective if a close relationship exists between the input measures (dollars) and
the desired outcome (which, in this context, is defined in terms of services).
To the extent that a system can be developed that focuses on outcomes
directly, the imprecision that necessarily flows from using an input-oriented
proxy for outcomes diminishes. The goal, in this regard, should be to develop
a remedy that directly addresses the services needed to make a plaintiff
"whole" or as close to "whole" as reasonably possible. Achievement of such
a goal requires focusing on the compensatory outcome desired for a tort victim
rather than on the proxy input of cash that may never be adequate. Phrased
differently, society (and the enlightened claimant) should be interested in the
desirable future outcome (being made whole by needed services), not in the
current estimated input (a dollar-denominated award). This section describes
a proposal for "paying" plaintiff/patients in kind with actual services rather
than with cash for the component of damages that is meant to provide services
for their health. This section will not address the other components of a
damage award, such as economic (wages) or noneconomic (pain and suffering)
losses.
A. The Basic Reform Proposal
Rather than paying severely injured plaintiffs the estimated present value
of necessary future services in a lump sum or the equivalent in periodic cash
payments, we propose that defendants found liable should fund an insurance
contract that will pay for (or provide) future services as needs arise. Our
proposal covers future services-medical care, nursing, custodial care, rehabil-
itation, education, and the like-for liability claimants whose injuries require
very long-term or lifetime care, ranging from deafness or loss of limb to
quadriplegia or severe brain damage.81 On the nine-point severity scale used
by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners and others,82 the
injuries would fall in categories "permanent significant" (deafness, loss of
limb, loss of eye, loss of one kidney or lung) code 6, "permanent major"
(paraplegia, blindness, loss of two limbs, brain damage) code 7, and
81. While private settlements could also provide for such contracts, we describe the formal provisions
for contracting after verdict and judgment.
82. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
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"permanent grave" (quadriplegia, severe brain damage, lifelong care or fatal
prognosis) code 8."
Our proposal would be implemented at the trial stage by providing the jury
with a new set of detailed instructions. In the current system, the jury must
predict the stream of future services that will be needed and their future prices,
and then discount to derive the present payment. Instead, we propose that the
jury should find via a special verdict whether, as a threshold matter, the case
falls within the appropriate severity category that would place it within the
contours of this plan. 4 If it does not, then the jury should value future
services according to the current system. If the injury is found to be permanent
and sufficiently severe, the case would fall under the proposed plan. In such
circumstances, the jury should state the general nature of services needed
instead of valuing the services. For example, the jury should specify that a
certain type of institutionalization (acute care hospital, rehabilitative or skilled
nursing facility, special educational institution) is needed with certain attendant
services, or that the plaintiff requires periodic or continuous care of certain
kinds (for example, physician, private duty nurse, physical therapist, speech
therapist). The jury should be instructed that the plaintiff's service needs will
be fully covered by a service contract paid for by the defendant and that the
jury should therefore compute other damages (wage loss, pain and suffering)
independently.8 5
The jury, overseen by the judge, should also specify the anticipated dura-
tion of the care. Lifetime services for permanent injuries would probably be
the most common outcome in these severe injury categories. In some cases,
however, duration might be limited to a fixed span of years or stated as "until
such time that damage is stabilized and no further special care is needed for
the injury" (as opposed to general care for ordinary needs, such as a new,
independent injury or aging).
Once the verdict establishes general guidelines for care, the following
process would develop specifications for contracts, find a specific contractor,
and obtain the price for the specified contractual services. After verdict, either
party could request the presiding judge to set aside the finding on liability or
seek an additur-like or remittitur-like change in the findings on service needs.
Once judgments on the verdict and any post-verdict motions are entered, the
extent of injury and the general need for and level of services will have been
established. The details of the judgment entered will be of particular impor-
83. For a description of the scale, see Bovbjerg, Sloan & Blumstein, supra note 2, at 921.
84. The descriptions of the severity categories would have to be elaborated more for use in a jury trial
than the sketchy explanation that was originally created to guide experienced insurance claims staff for
purposes of abstracting data. For one approach to creating vivid injury "scenarios," see Bovbjerg, Sloan,
& Blumstein, supra note 2, at 953-56.
85. Bovbjerg, Sloan, & Blumstein, supra note 2, consider approaches for scheduling payments for
pain and suffering. Scheduling of noneconomic loss may be combined with this proposal.
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tance because that order will establish the contract specifications which will
be subject to negotiation and put out for bid. We anticipate that a negotiation
process would develop between the parties on the terms of the order.86 The
judge would then instruct the parties to negotiate such a contract for care as
they see fit, within the timetable and parameters set by the judgment and
subject to ultimate approval by the court.87
To motivate good faith bargaining and resolve any disputes, the parties
should choose a mutually agreeable arbitrator.88 If the parties cannot agree
on an arbitrator, the court should appoint a special master to serve the same
functions. If the parties agree on a contract, the arbitrator would certify the
appropriateness of its provisions. The judge would review, approve, and enter
as the judgment in the case the negotiated and certified contract with regard
to damages for future services. Such a negotiated and certified agreement
should come to the court with a strong presumption of validity.
If the parties cannot agree to a contract within a court-specified time
period, the arbitrator or special master should resolve the parties' dispute under
the following final-offer rule. Each side should present to the arbitrator its final
proposal that was not accepted by the other side. A final proposal must consist
of a specified and enforceable contract proposal, together with a bid from a
qualified insurer or service provider to fulfill the contract, at a specified price
in current dollars,. binding for 30 days or other sufficient period for the arbi-
trator's review. -To resolve the difference between the two proposals, the
arbitrator must choose in its entirety whichever is the more reasonable of the
two offers measured in terms of fidelity to the terms of the final judgment
entered by the court. No "splitting of the difference" would be
allowed-indeed, no alteration of the two proposals and no third alternative
proposal would be considered.
Final-offer arbitration provides a tremendous incentive for the parties, who
become the solicitors of the bid proposals, to resist the impulse for padding
of bid proposals. Knowing that, upon an impasse in negotiations, a final offer
(i.e., an actual bid) will be presented to an arbitrator by each party on an
either/or, take-it-or-leave-it basis, a party has every incentive to resist gold-
plated proposals that do not place the available resources where they will be
of highest priority. Therefore, a party will suitably accommodate the terms and
provisions of the judgment entered by the court. A final-offer arbitration
86. If impasse is reached, the parties would present their positions to the court for resolution. A final-
offer technique is proposed for latter stages of the process. See infra text accompanying notes 89, 90 &
107-115. It would not be unreasonable for a court to consider its use even at this early stage. However,
the judge probably needs to have more discretion at this stage than final-offer would allow in interpreting
the intent of the jury as set forth in its verdict.
87. For further consideration of the nature of the contract, see infra text accompanying notes 96-106.
88. Presumably this would be someone with some expertise in insurance. Parties might wish to use
the services of the American Arbitration Association or a similar entity.
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procedure would, therefore, appear to have the important effect of curtailing
the potential for moral hazard in the bid development by the parties.
If only one party can provide a bid and that bid is deemed reasonable, it
would prevail. The arbitrator would be authorized to recommend rejection of
both offers if they were not faithful to the judgment, with the possibility of a
contempt citation for one or more of the attorneys."s The winning contract
proposal must then be executed and funded by the defendant. If neither party
could provide a bid, then either the arbitrator should negotiate a contract with
an insurer or a service provider or the judge who entered judgment should
make a financial award either as a lump sum or as a set of inflation-adjusted
periodic payments, as awards are made today.9" Either party would be able
to appeal the arbitrator's decision to the trial judge and eventually to an appel-
late court, but the standard for overturning the decision should be abuse of
discretion, that is, no reasonable person could have made the arbitrator's
choice. Moreover, the appealing party's own proposal should also be reviewed;
if it is found beyond the bounds of reasonableness, it should not be accepted
by the court. If neither party's proposal is deemed reasonable by the court (as
measured by adherence to the judgment entered), then the process should be
repeated with costs assessed against the culpable attorneys, as is currently the
practice under Federal Rule 11 and certain discovery rules.
The contract itself, as negotiated by the parties or proposed by each and
chosen by the arbitrator or special master, should cover all services that are
reasonable and necessary for care of the specified injury under prevailing
community standards at the time of service. These services are not merely
medical services and nursing care, but also include all other types of compen-
sable services as determined by the court's judgment. The contract should
specify those services with sufficient precision for the contract to be enforce-
able and for it to be adjudged consistently with the plaintiffs needs as set out
in the judgment. Both the type of service (for example, acute hospital service)
and the level of provider (for example, county hospital, community hospital,
tertiary care facility) must be stated.
The contract or contract proposal must also name the insurer or service
provider to perform the contract and the price for that performance. The
insurer may reimburse services on a fee-for-service basis or combine insurance
89. Cf. FED. R. cOv. P. 11.
90. Under some tort reforms, a jury award for large future damages triggers a periodic payment
provision and the judge is either allowed or required (sometimes at the option of either party) to structure
the award as a stream of future payments. See supra note 79. A financial judgment may also be appropriate
where the jury finds a high proportion of comparative negligence on the part of the plaintiff. Then the
liability award in its entirety may be too small to support 100% of future services needed. In such cases,
the injured person is likely to become a recipient of public assistance for disability, medical services, social
services, or income maintenance. Administrators of such public programs should be motivated to participate
in funding a future-services contract. See infra p. 210. If such "co-funding" cannot be secured, a high
comparative negligence injury would have to receive a cash award.
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and service provisions as in a Health Maintenance Organization. In case'either
party should ever wish to terminate the contract or a competent authority
should order it terminated (as in bankruptcy proceedings), the contract must
also specify two termination values-the prices at which the insured can "cash
out" the contract and at which the insurer can "buy out" the policy. These
prices must be stated as schedules for each year of the contract's duration,
beginning with the first day of the contract. Any penalty for cashing out in
expectation of death must be stated. The contract should either run between
the plaintiff and the insurer-provider or be enforceable by the plaintiff as a
third party beneficiary. The contract should be exempt from state insurance
regulation of policy forms, prices, and benefits. The plaintiff's claim against
the contractor should be deemed a secured interest and a vested right with
appropriate protection against bankruptcy (both through legal priority under
state law and through a bonding or bankruptcy insurance proviso).
B. Rationale
One expected effect of our proposal would be the creation of a bidding
market in which service providers and insurers who wish to manage a plain-
tiff's future services contract would compete to fulfill the specifications of the
contractual services set forth by the jury's verdict. With the development of
such a market, the bidding process should achieve more accurate values for
future care. Today's valuations rely on opinions of "experts" who in fact may
have little experience with the full set of future services a particular injury may
require and who have little stake in whether their estimates prove right.9" In
contrast, the insurers would have experience with many such cases, and would
put themselves at risk for the cost of future services. Improved accuracy may
encourage pre-verdict settlements, thereby reducing litigation cost.92
The insurance mechanism can diversify away the risk of unanticipated
changes in health status, a risk that even those plaintiffs who obtain
compensation at verdict bear under the current system.93 Under this plan,
plaintiffs would be partly protected against unanticipated changes in the prices
of services, whereas they have no such protection now if the structured
payments are not adjusted for inflation and potential changes in medical
technology. Further, the insurer would be obligated to cover newly-developed
safe and effective services appropriate to the care of the injured party, subject
to the express terms of the bid-i.e., terms that distinguish between reasonable
91. Of course, a "bad" expert risks loss of future employment as a witness, but it may take a lifetime
for the extent of the error to be clear.
92. See supra note 20.
93. Under periodic payment plans, the jury typically does not need to estimate the plaintiff's life
expectancy since the payment terminates with the payee's death. However, occasionally, as in Florida, the
unpaid balance is payable to the payee's estate. See Bovbjerg, supra note 1, at 529.
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anticipated changes in technology and unanticipated extraordinary break-
throughs. Plaintiffs receive no such assurance now, and there is no market for
such insurance to be purchased from cash payments. Moreover, economies
could well be available through contracting and prepayment. Even traditional
Blue Cross plans obtain better prices for hospital care than can an
individual,94 and Preferred Provider Organizations bargain for still lower
prices,95 while "managed care" options seek to control unnecessary spending
as well.
C. Analysis of Specific Provisions
1. Coverage
The plan would apply only to permanent and severe injuries requiring long-
term care, for only major injuries would justify the trouble and expense
involved in contracting.9" In practice, individual contracts for severe injuries
would be priced in hundreds of thousands and sometimes in millions of
dollars."
The proposal calls for all future services to be bundled together-unlike
existing insurance plans and public programs, which deal separately with
coverage for acute medical services, long-term nursing care, social services,
and other services. This large package of services may make it more difficult
for an insurer to know how to price and manage such an arrangement, but
long-term medical and social services are closely interrelated and are often
substitutes for one another. Thus, it is desirable to specify a unified package.
The contract would exclude services that treat conditions not causally
connected to the injury. Excluded services might often be covered by the
plaintiff's family health insurance policy (or public coverage), as they are now.
Nonacute health care services and non-medical services to be covered under
the contract would rarely be covered by private insurance. For certain com-
94. A claimant paying cash from a lump sum award must pay full hospital and other charges, whereas
Blue plans receive discounts. See, e.g., Frech, Monopoly in Health Insurance: The Economics of Kartell
v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, in HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HOSPITALS
AND HEALTH INSURANCE 303 (H. Frech ed. 1989); Adamache & Sloan, Competition between Non-Profit
and For-Profit Insurers, 2 J. HEALTH ECON. 225 (1983); Feldman & Greenberg, The Relation between
the Blue Cross Share and Blue Cross 'Discount' on Hospital Charges, 48 J. RISK INS. 235 (1981).
95. See generally, e.g., THE NEW HEALTHCARE MARKET: A GUIDE TO PPOS FOR PURCHASERS,
PAYORS AND PROVIDERS (P. Boland ed. 1985).
96. Less severe injuries typically involve less money. Since plaintiffs with lesser injuries face less
expenditure risk, any potential welfare gains from providing complete insurance would be less. The error
in estimating awards under the current system should also be less for less severe injuries, as would any
potential savings from the plan. Further, insurers would make bids customized to particular cases. Because
of the costs associated with developing customized bids, small individual contracts would probably not
attract bidders.
97. See, e.g., Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 31.
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plications and coexisting conditions, causality is not easily determined. Such
cases would have to be. resolved by negotiation between the plaintiff's health
insurer and the future-care contractor.
The contracting provisions of this proposed plan are to be triggered by a
finding about the objective severity of injury, not by a dollar amount as is done
for financial periodic payments. This approach helps assure that a jury will not
somehow trade off covered future care against other damages payable in cash
(for example, wage loss and nonpecuniary loss). 98 Further, if the jury had
to estimate the dollar cost of care first, some plaintiffs' lawyers on contingency
fee arrangements might inappropriately prefer a lump sum award to the added
work of negotiating a contract. 99
2. Scope of Contracts and Bids
Our plan specifies that coverage be provided for a range of services. The
tradition in tort law has been to require that the defendant pay all loss, regard-
less of funds available from collateral sources.' ° However, in recent years,
many state legislatures have modified the collateral source rule to allow infor-
mation on collateral sources to be introduced as evidence at trial and to permit
or require offset of funds from collateral sources in calculating the award.,'o
The tort law tradition regarding collateral sources is justified on the basis
of achieving efficient deterrence objectives. Potential tortfeasors should be at
risk for the full loss of their actions. However, the tradition in health insurance
is generally to coordinate benefits. The justification is that the insured should
not be paid twice for the same benefit." 2 Paying insureds twice in cash might
lead to moral hazard (malingering) in some situations. In others, two service
benefits would be inappropriate-who needs two splenectomies? To pay once
98. Juries may also be tempted to value service losses high in order to assure future care in a worst-
case scenario. See C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTHCARE LAW AND POLICY 734 (1988). The proposed contract
would do this better, allowing pooling of risk of like cases rather than worst-case thinking.
99. By avoiding undue optimism about awards at verdict on the part of the disputants, the plan may
also encourage settlements, thereby saving litigation cost to both sides. But see the caveat about risk
aversion of the litigants, supra note 5. However, there may be situations when a well-informed plaintiff
would prefer a contract and his attorney may prefer cash. This might occur either because the cash value
of the contract is less or, more likely, because securing a contract requires much more lawyer effort. Of
course, the cost of contracting could be made part of the fee set at the time the lawyer is retained. For a
general discussion of incentives under contingency fee versus per hour payment, see Danzon, Contingent
Fees for Personal Injury Litigation, 14 BELL J. ECON. 213 (1983).
100. See, e.g., D. DOBBS, supra note 23. The argument against collateral source offset is that to
exclude amounts obtained by the plaintiff from collateral sources will lead to underdeterrence because
defendants will no longer face the full expected cost of their actions. In addition, defendants will receive
an undue windfall from plaintiffs' having prudently bought their own coverage. See, e.g., R. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 186-91 (3d ed. 1986).
101. See Bovbjerg, supra note 1, at 501.
102. Provisions to prevent double payment in insurance policies are effectuated through subrogation
or coordination-of-benefits clauses. Such clauses are common in liability insurance and have become more
common in health insurance. R. MEHR & E. CAMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 131-34 (7th ed. 1980).
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in kind and the second time in cash could also induce moral hazard. If contract
benefits are to be coordinated, there is a question about who should pay first,
the plaintiff's health insurance policy (or public assistance) or the contracting
insurer.' 13 In the no-fault plans enacted in Virginia and Florida to provide
lifetime aid for infants with severe neurological birth injury, the injured party's
health insurance is primary, while the plans pay only net economic cost.'0 4
This may well be appropriate under plans that emphasize compensation rather
than deterrence. Our proposal grafts a new method of compensation onto a
fault-based determination of liability, so it is appropriate to make the injurer
(and the contract he funds) responsible for the full loss. Other coverages
available to the injured party should be secondary.'05
Contracts to cover long-term services must necessarily be quite complex.
The bids will include a premium, a list of covered services and exclusions
from coverage, a description of services anticipated to be performed under the
contract (data the actuary must have for premium-setting), and cash-out provi-
sions. However, juries can readily specify only broad provisions, and there
are numerous quality-cost tradeoffs that are difficult for any public decision-
maker to make and monitor.
For example, should the brain-damaged infant be housed in a private
facility near the parents or at a state facility 75 miles away? Should an injured
person receive group or individual psychotherapy, and how often? Is the local
hand surgeon good enough, or does the injured party deserve a trip to a
renowned surgeon at a distant medical center? Presumably the defendant will
argue that less is "good enough," while the plaintiff will want more. Under
the current system, experts on both sides have an incentive to overstate their
views of damages, believing that, whatever they argue, their opinions will
move the jury in their direction (so long as the arguments do not go so far
beyond reasonableness that they undercut their credibility on the basic issues).
Juries are inexperienced in evaluating both the efficiency and equity implica-
tions of the various demands cast in technical jargon. Our plan encourages
parties to work out the details of contracts through private negotiation rather
than by court order.
103. If coordination of future benefits could be agreed upon in advance, it should be possible to adjust
premiums accordingly. This does not happen to health insurance premiums since almost all such insurance
is sold on a group basis. On standard principles of coordination, see HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION
OF AMERICA, GROUP HEALTH INSURANCE 51-52, 220-24, 263-70 (1976 ed.).
104. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5000 to 5021 (Supp. 1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 766.301-.316
(West Supp. 1989).
105. S. SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 235-36 (1987). Subrogation provisions
in preexisting contracts of insurance are matters for private ordering or review, in appropriate circum-
stances, by insurance regulators. To the extent that this proposal may increase lawyers' time in litigation,
and thereby increase attorneys' fees, it might be appropriate to regard these fees as legitimate expenses
reimbursable by whatever preexisting collateral coverages might be available.
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Having to negotiate a future services contract of the complexity possible
here may seem to offer too many variables to consider at once. In fact,
however, it is not very different in character or in magnitude from what an
employer's benefits office has to do each year in choosing coverages for health
care, life insurance, disability, and even child care. Negotiating a future
services contract is harder in that it involves long-term services, but easier
because it covers only one specific client and not many different types of
employees with different preferences. There is insurance precedent for such
contracts in the recent experience with private long-term care (nursing home)
insurance, with the development of "lifecare communities," and in current
purchases of future medical insurance contracts under workers' compensa-
tion.'06
3. "Final-Offer" Dispute Resolution
The proposed best final-offer rule of dispute resolution is commonly used
in such diverse contexts as public sector contracts where the use of strikes is
considered to be unduly disruptive" 7 and salary disputes in major league
baseball.08 It is a positive feature of our proposal that the public sector has
ample experience with this form of arbitration.
Such final-offer arbitration seems preferable to conventional arbitration for
several reasons. First, where the parties are trying to influence a conventional
arbitrator's decision, they may readily adopt a more extreme stance in the
reasonable expectation that the arbitrator's decision will split the difference
between extremes, thus favoring them if they are more extreme."°9 Without
106. See irfra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., J. STERN, C. REHMUS, J. LOEWENBERG, H. KASPER & B. DENNIS, FINAL OFFER
ARBITRATION (1975). A list of state interest arbitration laws as of 1984 that indicates whether the law
specified conventional or final-offer arbitration is given in Freeman, Unionism Comes to the Public Sector,
24 J. ECON. LIT. 41, 72 (1986).
108. Final-offer arbitration for baseball began in 1973. Scully, Binding Salary Arbitration in Major
League Baseball, 21 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 431 (1978). The arbitrator must base his decision on a player's
performance, length of service, and salaries of players with comparable records and service in the league.
The arbitration option was exercised more frequently when the clubs had strong baseball players but poor
attendance (given that players are to be awarded on their individual performance) and when the club had
more experienced players (given that seniority must be considered). Id. at 443. This pattern would seem
to reflect the fact that the arbitrators were compelled to consider certain criteria in making their decisions,
and this result may not generalize to other contexts when arbitrators are not similarly constrained. See
generally Ashenfelter & Bloom, The Pitfalls in JudgingArbitrator Impartiality by Win-Loss Tallies Under
Final Offer Arbitration, 34 LAB. L.J. 534 (1983); Ashenfelter & Bloom, Models of Arbitrator Behavior:
Theory and Evidence, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 111 (1984).
109. Recent empirical evidence suggests that arbitrators' decision-making behavior may be similar
in both types of arbitration. See Farber & Bazerman, The General Basis ofArbitrator Behavior: An Empiri-
cal Analysis of Conventional and Final-Offer Arbitration, 54 ECONOMETRICA 819 (1986); Bazerman &
Farber, Arbitrator Decision Making: When Are Final Offers Important?, 39 INDUs. & LAB. REL. REV.
76 (1985); Bloom, Empirical Models of Arbitrator Behavior Under Conventional Arbitration, 108 REV.
ECON. STAT. 578 (1986); Ashenfelter & Bloom, supra note 108. Still, the behavior of arbitrators is only
part of the story. More critical is the effect of final-offer arbitration on the behavior of the disputants.
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the threat of a substantial disadvantage from an outlandish proposal, the parties
have a perverse incentive-a form of moral hazard-to develop and shop for
bids that operate centrifugally rather than centripetally. Where the arbitrator
must accept all the terms of one side or the other, submitting a final offer that
is "gold-plated" or seeking, sub silentio, to narrow the parameters set forth
in the court's entered judgment is potentially very costly. Each disputant has
a strong incentive to make reasonable offers to settle for fear of losing
badly. 1 '
Second, each party's offer is an actual bid; there is no guarantee that a set
of provisions or bid specifications deemed suitable and reasonable in the
abstract could actually be created and bid. If the arbitrator or the court were
able to rule for an intermediate version of the contract, it might specify
requirements, perhaps because of lack of knowledge, that no insurer could
honor. By encouraging the parties to seek out bids and to specify, at least
initially, the terms that conform to the entered judgment, final-offer arbitration
has the virtue of subjecting potentially abstract terms and conditions to the
realities of the market.
Third, our proposal should encourage settlements at the remedy stage
without invoking the final-offer arbitration procedure we propose.' l To the
extent that conventional, flexible arbitration does not adequately encourage
development of realistic bid specifications, it may prolong informal negotia-
tions and make resolution through negotiation less likely and more time-
consuming and expensive. In contrast, under final-offer arbitration risk-averse
parties have an incentive to settle the dispute themselves."' Thus, our idea
is to encourage private and informal dispute resolution by imposing a highly
uncertain mode of ultimate formal decisionmaking and by reinforcing the
tendencies toward compromise. Settlements between the parties themselves are
also likely to be qualitatively superior to arbitrated settlements because the
parties probably know more about their preferences and the states of the world
Their negotiating behavior is governed by their risk preferences, as well as the risk preferences of their
lawyers. The influence of the arbitration scheme on negotiating behavior of the parties has not been studied
empirically, except that settlement rates are higher in final-offer arbitrations. See infra notes 110, 111 &
114. For our purposes, that is a critical finding.
110. See Farber & Bazerman, Divergent Expectations as a Cause of Disagreement in Bargaining:
Evidence from a Comparison of Arbitration Schemes, 104 Q.J. EcoN. 99 (1989).
111. In the early years of final-offer arbitration in baseball, very few cases completed the arbitration
process. Over half the cases brought to arbitration were settled prior to a hearing. See Scully, supra note
108, at 439.
112. It is generally assumed that the major source of arbitration leverage, the cost of not settling
privately, arises from the parties' risk aversion. The parties are typically willing to sacrifice any gains from
an arbitrated resolution of the dispute to reduce uncertainty. See Farber & Katz, Interest Arbitration,
Outcomes, and the Incentive to Bargain, 33 INDus. & LAB. REL. REV. 55 (1979). See also, Gibbons,
Learning in Equilibrium Models ofArbitration, 78 AM. EcoN. REV. 896, 899 (1988). Much of the analysis
of final-offer versus conventional arbitration conducted to date has been theoretical.
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in which they operate than the arbitrator does." 3 Empirical evidence indi-
cates that settlement rates are much higher where final-offer rather than
conventional arbitration is the dispute resolution procedure."'
Fourth, final-offer arbitration serves the important function of reducing the
decisionmaking authority of the arbitrator. Whenever the range of discretion
is broadened, the decisionmaker's power is enhanced. That allows for the
decisionmaker's values to enter into the dispute resolution process in a very
central way. The goal of our proposal is to improve the jury system by normal-
izing decisions across similar cases. The bidding model we recommend is
designed to effectuate jury determinations by invoking market processes to
implement the substantive determinations of the jury as reviewed by the judge.
It would be highly subversive of the jury's primacy to endow an additional
decisionmaker with far-ranging powers on the issue of remedy. The final-offer
approach seems to preserve for the jury and for the court a much more central
role in the overall process because it makes clear that the parties themselves
have primary responsibility for working out a plan consistent with the court's
judgment. No other official will have authority to bend or shape the remedy
that is ultimately implemented. A more powerful role for the arbitrator runs
the risk of blurring the primary authoritative role of the trial jury.
Not only is too much discretion a troubling incursion on judge and jury
primacy, but it might also allow the arbitrator to select portions of plaintiffs
plan, portions of defendant's plan, and compromise on yet other portions of
the plans-all resulting in a hodgepodge of contract provisions on which no
insurer would bid. Experience shows that conventional arbitration is not
favored when decisions involving multifarious factors are at issue. For
example, parties seldom use arbitration in agreeing to an initial labor contract.
So many factors are at issue that use of the traditional adjudicative mode of
dispute resolution becomes unwieldy and somewhat arbitrary, threatening to
substitute the abitrator's values for those of the parties. Negotiation rather than
adjudication is preferable in such circumstances because only the parties are
able to assess the appropriate trade-offs when it comes to "fine-tuning" a deal:
How much is a party willing to give up in order to have medical care provided
in a nearby facility? What balance is appropriate between custodial amenities
and options for taking advantage of future technologies? Exactly how is cost
affected by a shift in the coverage package? These trade-offs would necessitate
far-reaching involvement by the arbitrator in the decision-making process. Such
matters should be left for the parties to negotiate within the parameters of the
entered judgment.
113. See Gibbons, supra note 112; Crawford, On Compulsory Arbitration Schemes, 87 J. POL. ECON.
131, 132 (1979).
114. See Farber & Bazerman, supra note 110, at 100; Scully, supra note 108.
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In sum, the final-offer procedure constrains the choices available to the
arbitrator and thereby curbs his discretion. Much like the President, who must
choose to sign or veto an entire bill, the arbitrator under our proposal must
choose between entire packages formulated by the parties themselves. There
is a bit of discretion in even that choice, but it is circumscribed and reviewable
in terms of reasonableness and fidelity to the judgment entered by the court.
Modified final-offer approaches have been suggested that may be
particularly useful for offers with many attributes that would help the parties
to reach a preferred position." 5 In one variant, each party presents the arbi-
trator with more than one final offer. For practicality, the number of offers
could be limited to three per side. The arbitrator selects the "best" offer among
the six. Rather than announce his choice, however, the arbitrator simply iden-
tifies the party that made the best offer. The loser then selects his choice
among the winner's three offers. Because the winner presumably is fairly
indifferent among the three multi-attributed offers he proposed, this technique
allows the loser to attain a preferred position at no appreciable cost to the
winner.
In our application, suppose the plaintiff is the loser, and he dislikes the
rehabilitation facility associated with one of the defendant's three bids. He can
be made better off by selecting another bid. Losing defendants can be expected
to select the least expensive of the plaintiff's three offers. The disadvantage
of multiple final-offer arbitration is that developing three offers is more costly
than developing one, and arbitrating among six options would also take longer
and cost more.
4. Choice of Arbitrator
The parties will select an arbitrator, or failing such agreement, the court
will appoint a special master. The standard for successful appeal of the
arbitrator's decision is abuse of discretion; the appealing party must show that
the choice made is clearly erroneous, and that no reasonable person would
have made the decision. Selection by the parties (and their knowledgeable
attorneys) in conjunction with court oversight should avoid biased and incom-
petent arbitrators. Moreover, arbitrators' desire to build and maintain a good
reputation offers considerable protection against incompetency." 6
115. See Donn, Games Final-OfferArbitrators Might Play, 16 INDUs. REL. 306, 310-14 (1977). See
also Crawford, supra note 113.
116. For an analysis of arbitrator selection under New Jersey's Fire and Policy Arbitration Law, see
Bloom & Cavanagh, An Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 408 (1986).
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5. Cashouts and Buy-outs
A plaintiff may choose to cash out the contract according to the specified
schedule at any time and for any reason, including the instance where he does
not trust the insurer-provider. The schedule would apply in case of insurer
bankruptcy as well. Cash will be most appealing to plaintiffs who have reason
to believe that they will use fewer services than the average plaintiff with an
equivalent injury, leaving the insurer with insureds who use higher than
average anticipated levels of service. To cope with this adverse selection
problem, we expect that most bids will exact a penalty from plaintiffs who cash
out. This penalty would have to be stated as part of the bid. Holding other
contract provisions constant, a higher penalty makes the bid less attractive. In
addition, contracts would likely have provisions for dealing with cashouts made
in anticipation of death, for even a fairly large penalty would not prevent
relatives of the dying person from demanding cash. For example, a prescribed
notice requirement could be imposed, with the proviso that a patient be alive
at the time the payout is contemplated. Alternatively, a high percentage of the
cash could be recoverable if the patient dies within a specified period.
Giving the insured the ability to terminate the contract is preferable as a
quality assurance mechanism to total reliance on other protections, such as
contempt proceedings, reopening matters upon a court's retention of juris-
diction, breach of contract actions brought against the insurer,117 or various
forms of regulation." 8 However, some reliance on these mechanisms may
still be necessary. In addition, an internal system of dispute resolution would
be a part of the plans proposed by the parties-a "voice" alternative to the
"exit" option of a cashout." 9
Two sources of risk cannot be readily diversified away by means of
insurance: unanticipated inflation in the price of covered services, and unantici-
pated technological change or other anticipated changes such as regulatory
action affecting the amount of services to be provided. If a new and more
effective service becomes available and becomes standard practice for treating
a certain condition, it is preferable that insurers not be positioned to deny it
on the basis of cost. 2 ' To bear both kinds of risk, insurers will want a
higher premium."'
117. Such litigation would be costly and time consuming. The payee who typically would be a heavy
user of services would be in limbo in the meantime.
118. See infra notes 127-33 and accompanying text.
119. See generally A. HIRSIMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY (1970).
120. An insurer who improperly denies care resulting in an adverse outcome may be liable if the
insured is totally reliant on the insurer. See Wickline v. State, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1175, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661,
appeal dismissed, 741 P.2d 613, 239 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1987).
121. Unanticipated inflation is a nondiversifiable risk readily analyzed within a capital asset pricing
model (CAPM). See Fairley, Investment Income and Profit Margins in Property-Liability Insurance: Theory
and Empirical Results, 16 BELL J. ECON. 192 (1979). Inflation in medical prices is plausibly correlated
with the return on a well-diversified portfolio of securities. Unanticipated technological change is probably
uncorrelated with this market return, and hence according to CAPM would not be priced. For a critique
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One could force defendants to bear these two risks in full. Defendants may
bear them presently if awards at verdict actually compensate plaintiffs for such
risk.122 One alternative we suggest is that insurers be able to limit their
downside risk by incorporating the ability to buy out insureds according to a
pre-specified schedule. Buyout amounts would typically be set appreciably
above the actuarial value of the policy at the time of issue. Bids with more
generous buyout schedules would be more valuable.
A potential deficiency of this suggestion is that an insurer wanting to "bail
out" without paying according to the higher buyout schedule could make life
miserable for the insured, hoping that the insured would take the initiative to
cash out at the lower schedule. The incentive to engage in such behavior would
depend on the difference between the cashout and the buyout prices.
An antidote for this type of behavior would clearly be necessary and could
take one or more of the following forms: (1) A plaintiff/victim could be
allowed to seek redress through a contempt proceeding in the court of original
jurisdiction without having to reinitiate litigation; a duty of continued represen-
tation would be established for the original attorney in the case, with allowance
of reasonable attorney's fees from the defendant if the contempt proceedings
were successful. Contempt proceedings take place in the context of strict
accountability, and would provide a friendly forum for a plaintiff/victim to
seek redress for the kind of clearly harassing behavior that could be used
against the plaintiff. (2) The plaintiff could institute new litigation, with provi-
sion for treble damages (as in the antitrust laws) and attorney's fees to a party
able to establish either willful noncompliance with the provisions of the
original contract or a pattern of vexatious conduct. Such relief would serve as
a deterrent against this type of abusive conduct. (3) Complaints could be kept
on file in a clearinghouse to provide a "Better Business Bureau" service
available to courts and future litigants. To the extent that an insurer wanted
to stay in the industry, such complaints could be devastating to its future
business prospects. 123
of CAPM as a pricing model for insurance, see Winter, The Liability Crisis and the Dynamics of Competi-
tive Insurance Markets, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 455, 468-69 (1988).
The issue of unanticipated technological change has analogies in other contexts, but the analogies are
not exact. For example, Posner used the example of a firm with a contract to drill for water. The contractor
encounters unexpectedly difficult soil conditions, and therefore cannot complete the job at the cost originally
projected. Posner argues that the contractor could self-insure at low cost because he does a lot of drilling
in different areas and the occurrences of unexpected soil conditions are independent. Further, the contractor
is probably the cheaper insurer of the two parties because he has better knowledge of the underlying proba-
bilities. See R. POSNER, supra note 100, at 94. The problem in our context is that occurrences of unantici-
pated, difficult "soil conditions" (i.e., unanticipated technological change) are not likely to be independent.
The contractor may have a better crystal ball than the payee, but it is probably not a very good one.
122. There is simply no empirical evidence on this point. On juries' potential "worst case" thinking,
see supra note 98.
123. This is true if the industry that develops is not concentrated. If there are few entrants in the field,
then the concentration would diminish the effectiveness of this type of deterrent, at least in the short run
until other firms can come into the industry.
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An alternative to cashouts would be for the plaintiff and defendant/insurer
to agree to a process for adjudicating later disputes, such as for assessing an
added cost for extraordinary and unforeseen changes in technology. The pro-
cess could include appointment of an arbitrator mutually agreeable to the
parties who would make the coverage decision. We would not want to rule out
this alternative mechanism for mid-course correction if the disputants preferred
it.
6. Characteristics of the Insurer
From a public policy perspective, a reason for preferring cash to service
benefits is that the former provides some safeguards against moral hazard. 4
When plaintiffs receive cash, they have an incentive to consider costs in pur-
chasing appropriate services because they are spending their own money.
Although we do not suggest that the plan be limited to such vertically
integrated entities, we allow for the insurer to also be a provider of services
or to participate in a joint venture with a service provider. Since the payor and
the service provider would have the same financial interests, there would be
some control of moral hazard.
More specifically, we expect bidders to be of at least two types. One,
similar to the traditional Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans or commercial insurers
in health care, would allow relatively free choice of actual provider, but main-
tain cost control through price and utilization controls. A second model would
resemble HMOs or a lifecare community, which limit utilization by combining
the insurance function with the actual delivery of care. It would probably have
to be a consortium of providers because services not included by any one
single entity would normally be provided under these contracts. If the idea
proves popular, one can expect new companies and joint ventures to form.
From the plaintiff's viewpoint, a provider-centered plan may also be location-
specific and hence not easily portable should the plaintiff or his family want
to move to a new job, for example. A financial intermediary or national HMO
could more readily accommodate such mobility. One can conjecture that
portability would be an important concern for some plaintiffs and less impor-
tant for others. Service providers could build in a portability feature at the
outset. Where services could not be provided because of a location change,
it would be necessary to use the cashout provisions to protect the plaintiff."z
124. See M. PAULY, MEDICAL CARE AT PUBLIC EXPENSE: A STUDY IN APPLIED WELFARE ECONOM-
ics 42-45 (1971). See also Sloan & Steinwald, 7he Role of Health Insurance in the Physicians' Services
Market, 12 INQUIRY 275 (1975).
125. The family's mobility is likely to be limited by a desire to live in proximity to specialized
facilities to care for the injured person.
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7. Regulation
Three areas may require different forms of regulation: premiums, solvency,
and quality. The most likely source of overpricing would be barriers
established by entry regulation, which could establish a monopoly. We suggest
that the contract be exempt from state insurance regulation of policy forms,
premiums, and benefits. Requiring approval from an insurance department to
bid on one or a few cases would substantially impede bidding.'26 The court's
oversight can readily substitute for whatever protection a state's insurance code
might give to parties crafting specialized coverages.
Some solvency protection is desirable. To the extent that a contract for
care incorporates an existing insurance policy, existing regulatory protections
will automatically apply. State guaranty funds may not apply if the basic con-
tract is not insurance.' 27 Transactions would be relatively rare, so courts or
other agencies could facilitate the bidding process and provide some oversight
by "prequalifying" potential bidders, as governments and other large buyers
do in contracting and as employers do in getting the health insurance options
among which insured employees select a plan. It probably would be most
appropriate to locate the prequalification function in a state agency directly
involved in medical care and social services than in the judiciary. But it is
important to be particularly sensitive to the adverse consequences of entry
barriers in implementing this plan.
The most troubling issue is assuring the ongoing performance of the
service contract, which is undeniably harder to monitor and enforce than a
purely financial one, such as an annuity. Short-term service contracts pose
fewer monitoring problems than long-term ones, but also present fewer
potential advantages. A long-term contract offers the advantage of making it
profitable to invest now for distant payoffs. For example, investment in special
education services may permit a retarded child to work as an adult. 2 ' A
126. Congress has been moving in the direction of reducing entry barriers to insurers at the state level.
See Product Liability Risk Retention Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-45, 95 Stat. 949 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 3901-06 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)); Risk Retention Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
563, 100 Stat. 3170 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3901-06 (Supp. IV 1986)). Congress concluded that insurance
markets had a shortfall in capacity of billions of dollars, thus directly curbing availability of coverage and
indirectly allowing great upswings in prices. H.R. No. 865, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMtN. NEWS 5303. Overpricing could also occur if the market is too small to initially
attract multiple insurers. Still, insurance regulation is a poor tool.
127. This discussion assumes that the risk-bearing nature of the contract means that it could be
construed as an insurance contract by a state commissioner. In a number of jurisdictions, however, this
plan would not involve insurance but rather a service contract much like an extended warranty service plan
for a consumer good. This matter could be clarified in the enacting legislation.
128. Contracts of long duration are more likely when relationship-specific investments are more
important. See Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON.
REV. 519 (1983); Joskow, Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence
from Coal Markets, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 168 (1987). In insurance markets in which insureds can easily
switch insurers, insurers plausibly undersupply loss protection. See Schlesinger & Venezian, Insurance
Markets with Loss-Prevention Activity: Profits, Market Structure, and Consumer Welfare, 17 RAND J.
ECON. 227 (1986).
Yale Journal on Regulation
provider or intermediary acceptable today might no longer perform well thirty
years later, well within the scope of time needed to care for a permanently
injured newborn child, for example.
Prequalifying at one court or state agency may provide an insufficient
incentive to prevent insurer shirking. Another option, already noted,' 29 would
be to establish a national data bank to which instances of decertification and
possibly consumer complaints could be reported.'30 Another protection would
be to allow plaintiffs to obtain the insurer buyout price if they can demonstrate
to the court that the insurer failed to fulfill the terms of the contract. Failing
to prove this case, the plaintiff could cash out at the lower cashout price. An
alternative would be to rely on licensure of providers and insurers. Substantial
violations could be cause for revocation of license, at least with regard to these
judicially overseen insurance contracts.'
When a structured contract results from a settlement, one must first look
to the plaintiff's attorney to investigate the contractor. When the contract is
negotiated after a jury finding, the arbitrator or special master and then the
judge must oversee the choice. Where the contract is made directly with
providers of services, the practitioners should be independent of the liability
insurer so that they will act in the interests of the plaintiff as their patient, not
the company paying them.'32 When the contract for care is made with a
financial intermediary (for example, a health insurer), the intermediary
naturally stands between the defendant (and his liability insurer) and the actual
provider of services.
D. Practical Feasibility
The plan calls for development of a new market in long-term insurance or
services contracts. The major feasibility issue is whether insurers would be
129. See supra text accompanying note 123.
130. There are precedents for such national data banks, such as the Medical Information Bureau for
life insurance, see Mehr & Cammack, supra note 102, at 611, and for credit bureaus (both keeping data
on consumers). On data about insurers, see supra note 42. A new data bank has been established for
physicians and other health care providers pursuant to the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986.
See supra note 39.
131. For a brief history of regulation of insurance in the United States, see J. DOBBYN, INSURANCE
LAW 287-99 (1989). We know of no data on delicensure of insurers, although the overall record of
insurance regulation is mixed, which may partly be due to "capture" of the regulatory process by insurers.
Pauly, Kunreuther, & Kleindorfer, Regulation and Quality Competition in the U.S. Insurance Industry,
in THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE REGULATION: A CROSS NATIONAL STUDY 65-107 (J. Finsinger and
M. Pauly eds. 1986). The notion that the regulated have captured the regulators seems more clearly true
for physician licensure. See, e.g., P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE
44-47, 102-12 (1982).
132. This is not an idle point where the liability defendant is a physician or hospital and the liability
insurer is run by medical providers, as most are. On the other hand, medical providers are almost always
paid by insurers or HMOs rather than directly by patients. Thus, they are accustomed to maintaining a
patient's interest at least somewhat independent of the payor's.
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reluctant to submit bids because they have inadequate experience on which to
determine expected losses.133
1. Insurance-Oriented Concerns
If insurers are reluctant to submit bids, it may be necessary to allow or
require joint bidding during the initial phases of the program until the neces-
sary experience can be obtained. Alternatively, at least in the initial stages,
it might be necessary for states to require insurance carriers doing business
in the state to participate in the plan.
Another criticism may be that the insurance transactions costs and thus the
"loading" on individually underwritten contracts would be high; health insurers
write group policies much more inexpensively. A response to this objection
is that because each of these contracts would involve large dollar amounts, the
load to cover the cost of specialized underwriting and bidding would be small
relative to the actuarial value of the loss.
A further potential objection is that the number of cases may be insufficient
to permit contractors to diversify away the risk of unanticipated changes in
health status. Actually, such cases of very severe injury are numerous. A
recent summary of vehicle crash studies estimated that about 60,000 persons
suffer disabling brain injuries and about 4,000-5,000 persons suffer disabling
spinal cord injuries annually.134 Given the idea of structured care, govern-
ments might independently be buyers. They might buy as part of running
programs for severely injured people or to help tortiously injured plaintiffs in
lieu of later covering the injuries under those programs.135
If the potential market is so large, a pertinent question is why there are no
such transactions currently. One explanation is inertia and dissimilarity from
conventional coverages; another is the fear of adverse selection, which held
up the development of long-term care insurance as well. One response is that
the plan legislated would stabilize demand by guaranteeing a minimum amount
of bidding. Also, the adverse selection problem would be less severe because
every eligible case for which liability is found at verdict would be bid and also
because much of the information hidden in a voluntary individual insurance
process would be discoverable. Adverse selection would be a much greater
problem in the nonlitigated cases.
133. During the preparation of this Article, this contracting proposal drew this skeptical response from
staff at one major multiple-line insurer. One possible source of data for projecting future claims is the
experience of workers' compensation insurers, who have lifetime responsibility for medical bills of certain
injured workers. See also infra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
134. Luchter, Traffic Related Disabilities and Impairments and their Economic Consequences, in
CRASH INJURY IMPAIRMENT AND DISABILITY: LONG TERM EFFECTS, 93-103 (Society of Automotive
Engineers Rep. No. SP-661, Feb. 1986).
135. There is increasing interest in "privatizing" governmental services, that is, contracting for private
entities to provide care once provided by public entities. See, e.g., Pack, Privatization of Public-Sector
Services in Theory and Practice, 6 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 523 (1987) (overview of 20-article
symposium issue).
Yale Journal on Regulation
2. Some Promising Precedents
The "proof of the pudding" is, however, in insurers' actual responses.
Several precedents give reason for tempered optimism. First, health insurers
have insured persons with catastrophic, long-term injuries and illnesses for
years. Because virtually all health insurance is sold on a group basis,136 with
premiums adjusted annually, many insurers may not actually know what the
long-term cost of such illness actually is. However, insurers' data bases are
improving, and longitudinal cost data spanning several years are available on
Medicare beneficiaries, including those eligible by virtue of long-term
disability.' 37
A second precedent is legislation recently enacted in two states to provide
no-fault recovery for infants with severe neurological impairment from mech-
anical or hypoxic problems during labor, delivery, or neonatal management.
These laws, passed in 1987, seek to remove cases of severe neurological birth
injuries from the tort-law-and-liability-insurance system into a purely social-
insurance scheme. This scheme is one version of a no-fault approach, which
trades a non-fault, "easier" finding of responsibility for a far more structured
approach to damages.' 38 These plans exclude such babies from the traditional
fault-based litigation system and put them in a special long-term, insurance-like
program. The plans cover all medical and rehabilitative services as they accrue
for the life of the child. There is no payment for pain and suffering, wage
losses are estimated from a mean value, and all collateral sources of payment
take precedence. These plans are gaining experience in providing such cover-
age that will help them cover neurologically-impaired infants under our
proposal.
A third, and similar, precedent is modern workers' compensation pro-
grams, in which the liability insurer liquidates its open-ended obligation to
cover medical services to a long-term disabled person. It is now possible to
predict long-run costs and to obtain contracts for health insurance coverage
for the natural lifetime of a disabled worker.' 39
A fourth relevant recent development comes from long-term care, largely
in nursing homes, for the disabled and the elderly. Traditionally, such expenses
were considered too unpredictable to insure. Long-term care insurance has
therefore been slow to evolve until recently for a number of reasons: adverse
selection, moral hazard, and the high price of such insurance even in the
136. HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, 1986-87 SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE
DATA at 21.
137. HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, MEDICARE STATISTICAL FILES MANUAL 227-53
(July 1988).
138. See supra note 104.
139. Staff of a large, national workers' compensation carrier so informed us during the preparation
of this Article. We were told this company felt that it could itself predict future medical expense and handle
such payments "in house" rather than contracting with an outside insurer. Either way, there is experience
with long-term projections of medical spending.
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absence of adverse selection and moral hazard. 4 In recent years, the market
for long-term care insurance has developed markedly. In 1986, 125,000
policies were in force and by 1988, over one million.' 4 '
To date, almost all policies have been sold to persons over age sixty-five,
but several large employers are now offering a long-term care insurance option
to their employees. 42 Signing up policyholders -years in advance of the time
that rates of use can be anticipated may be an effective way of dealing with
adverse selection. That consumers seem to want protection against expenditure
risk far in the future and that insurers are willing to assume such risks with
a long claims tail suggest that our proposal is both desirable and feasible.
Long-term care insurance differs, however, in four important respects from
our proposal. First, most policies pay indemnities (fixed dollar subsidy per'
day) rather than service benefits. The indemnity provisions protect against
moral.hazard and give insurers protection against unanticipated inflation and
technological change. Second, such insurance covers much less than the
insurance contracts envisioned by our proposal. Third, the loss data on long-
term care are better at present than for the losses we propose to insure. Fourth,
most long-term-care insurance does not combine the insurance and provision
functions, a feature we suggest as an attractive option in our proposal.
However, lifecare communities do combine these functions."'
A fifth precedent is the appearance of combined residential-medical retire-
ment ("lifecare") communities that offer comprehensive services of increasing
intensity for aging residents with varying levels of need.'" These mainly not-
for-profit entities provide residence, social services, nursing home services and
other medical care, all typically at the same site. The communities are popular
and have spread quickly; some 680 lifecare communities operated in the U.S.
by 1987, covering some 200,000 people.'45 Many of these communities
would probably not accept many seriously injured residents; much of their
appeal derives from their residential component, which promises companion-
ship as well as security, and many communities do not accept people who are
not mentally alert and functionally independent.'" It is plausible, therefore,
that a large market could develop in such services because the demand for such
expensive care is potentially very great-as it is for nursing home care. The
140. See, e.g., Wallack, Recent Trends in Financing Long-Term Care, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 97
(Ann. Supp. 1988).
141. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE: STATE REGULATORY
REQUIREMENTS PROVIDE INCONSISTENT CONSUMER PROTECTION 2 (1989).
142. Id. at 10.
143. See infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., A. RtVLIN & J. WIENER, CARING FOR THE DISABLED ELDERLY: WHO WILL PAY?
83-95 (1988).
145. Id. at 83. Few communities cover all the services needed by the disabled; home care is often
limited or even excluded. An experimental new model of "lifecare at home" may yet offer similar financial
and medical security to stay-at-home elderly. See Tell, Cohen, Larson & Batten, Assessing the Elderly's
Preferences for Lifecare Retirement Options, 27 GERONTOLOGIST 503 (1987).
146. See A. RIvLIN & J. WIENER, supra note 144, at 87.
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phenomenon offers evidence that our proposed model could create a market,
but the lifecare concept would have to be modified to accommodate it.
3. Other Implementation Issues
Medical professionals have often been hostile to the development of man-
aged care, bidding, and other approaches that in some sense threaten traditional
professional prerogatives.147 In the case of these structured contracts for care,
the assured stream of support for private-sector care might bring new political
support. Since physicians and hospital-run malpractice insurers would be major
beneficiaries of this liability reform, there would be further motivation to
cooperate.
Would arranging for contracts be prohibitively costly? There certainly are
costs to arranging such a contract, but they would vary greatly with the com-
plexity of care needed and the length of the time period contemplated. 45
Long-term contracts would probably only be feasible where expected expenses
are sizable, as is often the case. And even for smaller cases, framing settle-
ment negotiations in terms of the need to contract for future services could
serve as a useful "reality check" for unrealistic expectations on either side.
Would contracts be impractical where the liability award or settlement
could not cover all appropriate care? In settlements, for example, the parties
normally compromise for lower damages than a winning plaintiff would collect
after trial,'49 so that the "full" damage award is not available to fund a ser-
vice contract. A high level of comparative negligence on the part of the
plaintiff would have similar effect. Moreover, the plaintiff's lawyer's fee also
must be subtracted before the contract is funded (as is done now for annuities).
However, available information indicates that smaller settlements and awards
have proportionately larger non-economic components 50 so that even smaller
settlements might fund future care if well structured. Additionally, higher
awards often have a lower percentage attorney's fee. Further, a plaintiff could
gain from a structured contract even if he had to fund part of it from other
sources-perhaps collateral sources such as disability pensions or Social
Security. It might even be conceivable that Medicaid or other social programs
could join in the structuring in very serious cases where a plaintiff is at high
risk of becoming a public charge.
147. See Bovbjerg, Held & Diamond, Provider-Patient Relations and Treatment Choice in the Era
of Fiscal Limitations: The Case of the End-Stage Renal Disease Program, 65 MILBANK MEM. FUND Q.
177 (1987).
148. It would not be expensive to negotiate for near-term care of specific types, for example,
rehabilitation or restorative surgery-at least not compared with the other transaction costs of the litigation
system. Many insurers, HMOs, and even governments now make specialized short-term contracts for care
and might undertake these bargains as well, but we focus in this Article mainly on the long term.
149. See, e.g., Danzon & Lillard, supra note 31; Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 31.
150. See NAIC, supra note 73.
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E. Constitutionality
As in the case of the presumptive scheduling/common-law-of-damages
proposal, it is useful to consider potential constitutional challenges as part of
the initial policy discussion. Again, we make no claim of comprehensiveness,
but wish to include a brief overview to bolster our sense that the insurance-
contracts-for-future-services proposal will likely pass constitutional muster.
Promising to provide needed future services to seriously injured plaintiffs,
rather than paying them an equivalent cash sum, gives them significant benefits
not found in many past tort reforms. Hence the constitutional context within
which a reviewing court would judge the proposal's validity is quite different
from that of a flat cap on awards or mandatory offset for collateral benefits,
which merely take away traditional plaintiffs' prerogatives while conferring
no obvious benefit to plaintiffs as a class, at least when viewed after the fact.
Even in states requiring a quid pro quo when common law causes of action
are abrogated, our proposal should be upheld. 5'
Like presumptive scheduling, this proposal should survive attack on equal
protection grounds. The proposal reforms all severe personal injury cases in
the same way152 and creates rational distinctions among the needs of suc-
cessful plaintiffs for future services. Those in most need, according to severity
of injury, would receive precise compensation for the extent of their loss, in
kind, instead of a conjecture about what funds might meet those needs for
future years. The process would thus directly address important state interests
of fairly compensating the neediest plaintiffs, and keeping them from becoming
public charges at some time in the future, should a cash award be insufficient
or prematurely dissipated. Lesser injuries either do not need long-term future
services (the temporary injuries) or are financially too small (the minor per-
manent injuries) to support the transactions costs involved-quite rational
distinctions, not arbitrary or discriminatory in any suspect or otherwise inap-
propriate way.
This proposal should also withstand a challenge based on denial of a right
to jury trial because it does not contemplate supplanting the common law role
of the jury. The jury would evaluate the loss and decide what care is needed.
The proposal merely relieves the jury of having to guess at the current value
of the remedy it has decided upon by determining it through market-driven
processes.153 Moreover, the final-offer process of resolving disputes is
designed to reduce the scope of the arbitrator's decisionmaking discretion,
151. See, e.g., Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 243 Kan. 333, 757 P.2d 251 (1988);
Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W. 2d 687 (Tex. 1988); Smith v. Department of Insurance, 507 So. 2d 1080
(Fla. 1987). See generally Bovbjerg, Sloan & Blumstein, supra note 2, at 971 n.264.
152. See supra note 70.
153. See Bovbjerg, Sloan & Blumstein, supra note 2, at 972-74.
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thereby respecting and preserving the primacy of the jury and private negotia-
tions. 154
In sum, the reform should pass muster under generally prevailing constitu-
tional standards of analysis.
Conclusion
Liability law has vague standards for assessing damages in personal injury
suits and relies too heavily on ad hoc valuations that ignore relevant informa-
tion. The process is expensive and unpredictable, and it unfairly yields quite
variable results in. similar cases. We agree with many prior proposals calling
for reform, but believe that the current system should be improved rather than
wholly replaced. The tort system's central tendencies accord with traditional
notions of individuated fairness and are quite consistent with legal theory and
reasonable expectations. It is the extremes that most need attention. The two
reforms discussed for improving assessment of damages should achieve more
accurate awards in individual cases of personal injury and should promote
consistency of results across cases.
The creation of a more predictable common law of damages in tort cases
is consistent with traditional case-by-case judicial approaches and with recent
trends in making institutions generally more accountable. It could improve the
performance of the judicial system by helping it to learn more systematically
from its own past performance on awarding damages, just as it now does on
issues of substantive law.
The proposal to encourage "structured" awards in the form of contracts
for future care echoes two current trends. The first is to protect plaintiff and
defendant alike by structuring large financial liabilities through periodic rather
then lump sum payment. The second trend is the growing tendency of health
insurance and government programs to act as prudent purchasers by managing
care, especially through private contracts, rather than as parties that simply
pay bills as they are presented. Contracts for future care offer the prospect of
better prediction of future needs and more accurate discounting of future risks
into current dollars as well as better protection for injured plaintiffs for as long
as their injuries need attention.
Another very attractive feature of these proposals is that they do not
merely take away traditional tort prerogatives. Both sides have something to
gain from their implementation. Society in general also stands to gain from
the increased incentives for the parties to agree on the value of a case and to
settle it at a lower transaction cost.
154. Nor does the proposal constitute legislative usurpation of the proper judicial function, see supra
note 69, since the arbitrator or special master would report directly back to the trial judge for approval.
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